

ADDRESSING THE MILITARY GAP IN THE WESTERN BALKANS AND
CLOSING THE GAP THROUGH REGIONAL COOPERATION

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Strategic Studies

by

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ABSTRACT

ADDRESSING THE MILITARY GAP IN THE WESTERN BALKANS AND
CLOSING THE GAP THROUGH REGIONAL COOPERATION, by Maj Perparim
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After the conflicts ended in the former Yugoslavia in the late 1990s, the Western Balkan countries began working to fulfill their commitment to the Euro-Atlantic organizations. In 2003, the United States led Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia to establish the Adriatic Charter Partnership (A-3). In 2008, Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina joined to form Adriatic Charter Partnership (A-5). Through the partnership, countries transformed their armed forces in line with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) standards. As the result of this partnership, Albania and Croatia became NATO members in 2009. Montenegro finalized the ratification process, and Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina are working towards NATO membership. The security environment and budget constraints have delayed the Western Balkans' strategic goal of integration and fulfilling the Euro-Atlantic requirement for collective defense. Sharing a common security environment, mutual interest in Euro-Atlantic institutions, and consequences of budget constraints has led to addressing the military gap and building an approach to close these gaps. The research endorses regional cooperation as a smart approach to develop joint enabling capabilities and mutual response for collective defense. Regional cooperation enhances peace, stability, and interoperability throughout the Western Balkans.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE THESIS APPROVAL PAGE	iii
ABSTRACT.....	iv
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	v
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	vii
ACRONYMS.....	x
ILLUSTRATIONS	xi
TABLES	xii
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION	1
Problem Statement.....	4
Primary Research Question	5
Secondary Research Questions.....	5
Limitations	5
Delimitations.....	5
Definition of Terms	6
Assumptions.....	8
Significance of the Study.....	9
Summary	9
CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW	12
Introduction.....	12
Regional Overview and Security Assessment	14
Transformation and Military Capabilities.....	18
Adriatic Charter: A Regional Cooperation Approach for Common Response.....	23
CHAPTER 3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY	27
Introduction.....	27
CHAPTER 4 ANALYSIS	34
Introduction.....	34
Threat Assessment	36
Regional Overview and Assessment of Strategic Environment in the Western Balkans Cooperation.....	38

Political Assessment	40
Albania.....	40
Bosnia and Herzegovina	41
Croatia.....	43
Macedonia.....	45
Montenegro	46
Economic	47
Albania.....	47
Bosnia and Herzegovina	48
Croatia.....	49
Macedonia.....	50
Montenegro	51
Social.....	52
Albania.....	52
Bosnia and Herzegovina	53
Croatia.....	53
Macedonia.....	54
Montenegro	54
Military	55
Organization.....	56
Albania.....	56
Bosnia and Herzegovina	61
Croatia.....	66
Macedonia.....	72
Montenegro	76
Training.....	80
Albania.....	80
Bosnia and Herzegovina	85
Croatia.....	86
Macedonia.....	88
Montenegro	90
Adriatic Charter Cooperation: A Regional Approach for Common Response	91
The History of Regional Cooperation.....	94
Lines of Efforts of the Adriatic Charter Cooperation	97
Line of Effort 1: Strategic Lift	97
Line of Effort 2: Air Surveillance and Air Defense.....	98
Line of Effort 3: Explosive Ordinance Disposal Capabilities	100
Line of Effort 4: Disaster Relief Response Capabilities	102
Line of Effort 5: Joint Training and Exercise	105
Line of Effort 6: Medical Capabilities	107
 CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS	 110
Introduction.....	110
Regional Cooperation: A Comprehensive Approach for Mutual Response	116

Implications for the Armed Forces of A-5.....	117
Recommendations for Other Research	118
BIBLIOGRAPHY	119

ACRONYMS

A-3	U.S.-Adriatic Charter-3
A-5	U.S.-Adriatic Charter-5
AAF	Albanian Armed Forces
AFBiH	Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina
AFMNE	Armed Forces of Montenegro
ARM	Army Republic of Macedonia
BMTF	Balkan Medical Task Force
BRAAD	Balkan Regional Approach to Air Defense
CAF	Croatian Armed Forces
CBRN	Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Weapons
CIMIC	Civil Military Cooperation
DFAC	Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces
DOTMLPF	Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership, Policy, Facilities
EOD	Explosive Ordnance Device
EU	European Union
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
MAP	Membership Action Plan
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NMS	National Military Strategy
NSS	Nation Security Strategy
PfP	Partnership for Peace
SAR	Search and Rescue
SDR	Strategic Defense Review

ILLUSTRATIONS

	Page
Figure 1. Design Methodology and Operation Approach	28
Figure 2. Map of the Western Balkans	40
Figure 3. Operational Approach of Adriatic Charter Regional Cooperation	109

TABLES

	Page
Table 1. Albanian Armed Forces	57
Table 2. Defense Budget of the Albanian Armed Forces	58
Table 3. Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina	62
Table 4. Defense Budget of the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina	62
Table 5. Croatian Armed Forces	67
Table 6. Defense Budget of Croatian Armed Forces	70
Table 7. Army of the Republic of Macedonia	73
Table 8. Defense Budget of the Army of the Republic of Macedonia.....	74
Table 9. Armed Forces of Montenegro	77
Table 10. Defense Budget of the Armed Forces of Montenegro	78

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

After the conflict ended in the former Yugoslavia in the late 1990s, the Western Balkan countries entered a new phase, beginning to work together to fulfill their commitment to the Euro-Atlantic institutions. The United States played a significant role in the transformation and defense reforms of these countries to promote peace and security in the Western Balkans region.¹ In 2003, the United States led Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia to established Adriatic Charter Partnership Initiative-3 (A-3).² In 2008, Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina joined and the partnership was renamed Adriatic Charter-5 (A-5).³ These initiatives leverage regional cooperation to support the Western Balkan countries' goals, fulfill the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) requirements for membership, and promote good community among the Western Balkans.⁴ The partnership was open to other countries in the region. Since 2008, Serbia has been in an observer status. Kosovo is in observer status and applied for membership

¹ Steven Woehrel, *Future of the Balkans and U.S. Policy Concerns* (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, May 13, 2009).

² Comprehensive Regional Ministerial, Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Croatia, "US-Adriatic Charter Initiative," 2015, accessed December 20, 2016, <https://www.morh.hr/en/agendacrm/a5/240-crm2015/agenda/12143-crm-2015-za-web-hrvatski.html>.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

in 2012.⁵ In 2009, because of this partnership, Albania and Croatia became NATO members. Montenegro completed the ratification process and expects to be a member in mid-2017. Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina are working towards NATO membership. In 2008, NATO invited Macedonia, Albania, and Croatia to join, but Greece rejected Macedonian membership in NATO due to disputes on its constitutional name of Macedonia.

The strategic goal, integration to the Euro-Atlantic organizations had a significant impact on the Western Balkans, particularly to the A-5 countries. Countries have to undertake significant transformation reform not only in the military area, but also in political, economic, social, and rule of law areas. NATO issued a capability package to the new members (Albania and Croatia), which consists of 49 military capabilities which these countries will develop in line with NATO requirements and guidance. The candidate members are working on developing force goals, which has almost the same requirements as capability targets. Thus far, the development of these objectives as national and NATO obligations have been hindered for political and economic reasons, and has been affected by the U.S. and European Union (EU) foreign policy towards the Western Balkans. Currently, in the A-5, only Croatia has succeeded in becoming a member of NATO (2009) and the EU (2013). Albania became a member of NATO in 2009, and has been a candidate member of the EU since 2014. In addition to NATO membership, the parliament of the Republic of Montenegro recently approved their membership in NATO. Of the 28 NATO countries, 27 of them have ratified

⁵ Wikipedia, "U.S -Adriatic Charter," Wikipedia Foundation, 2015, accessed November 8, 2016, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Adriatic_Charter.

Montenegro's membership in the alliance. Once the last country, Spain, approves Montenegro's membership, then Montenegro is officially a NATO member. Like Albania, Montenegro is a candidate member of the EU. In 2008, Macedonia was invited to join NATO, along with Albania and Croatia, but Macedonian membership was rejected by Greece due to disputes about the constitutional name Macedonia. In terms of EU membership, Macedonia maintains the same status as Albania, Montenegro, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. In the framework of the Adriatic Charter Partnership, these countries have been contributing to a joint effort with combined teams in multinational operations, fighting against international terrorism in Afghanistan.

The strategic documents, national security strategy (NSS), national military strategy (NMS), white policy papers on defense, and strategic defense review (SDR) of each country in the A-5, present the desired end state, objectives, threats, and challenges that Western Balkans is facing to meet their strategic goal. The development of the Western Balkans is characterized by political instability, disputes, and a lack of resources to invest in defense to reach the 2 percent NATO goal. Another factor that has caused delays in the integration process is the rise of complexity in the environment, challenges, and the shift of focus of U.S. policy from the Western Balkans to the Middle East. Many scholars wrote that the decrease in U.S. involvement in the Western Balkans and unfinished business regarding disputes have brought an increase in Russian involvement in the Western Balkans.⁶ Although the EU is working to integrate the Western Balkans,

⁶ Janusz Bugajski, *Return to Balkan, Challenges to European Integration and U.S. Disengagement*, The LeTort Papers (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press, May 2013), accessed October 18, 2016, <http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/21240948>, 1.

the perception of the Western Balkans is that these problems cannot be solved without substantial involvement by the United States.

Sharing similar geographic and security environments, the aspiration to join the Euro-Atlantic organizations, and consequences of force reduction and budget constraints, led to further research to define a common approach of cooperation for developing defense capability.

The thesis investigates the military gap and challenges among the A-5 partnership to fulfill national and NATO objectives for collective defense. The research also addresses the potential capabilities of the A-5 countries, which can be used as a complementary capability for other A-5 countries in the partnership. Finally, it defines the possible area of cooperation, and designs an operational approach with military lines of effort to close the gap between the current condition of the A-5 and the desired end state.

Problem Statement

After late 1990s, the Adriatic countries set the strategic goal of membership in the Euro-Atlantic organizations.⁷ To achieve this goal, Adriatic countries are facing political, economic, and security challenges that hinder the fulfillment of national and NATO objectives. The budget constraints and inability to meet the 2 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) on defense expenditures has caused delays in developing military capabilities for contribution to collective defense. These circumstances, the common security environment, and common national interests of membership in Euro-Atlantic

⁷ Woehrel, 1.

institutions led to a search to address the military gaps and enhance regional cooperation as a smart solution to develop military capabilities for a mutual response.

Primary Research Question

What are the military capability gaps in the Western Balkans, and how will regional cooperation through the Adriatic Charter Partnership close the gaps?

Secondary Research Questions

1. What is the security environment in the Western Balkans region?
2. What are the national interests and strategic objectives?
3. What is the status of military development in Western Balkan countries?
4. What has determined the regional cooperation?

Limitations

The analysis will refer to open sources and will not address the details of each capability target since these sources are classified.

Delimitations

This research will analyze only the countries that are part of the A-5 initiative: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, and Montenegro. The focus of research will be on military capability gaps, mostly those connected to joint enabling or sustainment capabilities, which allow them to participate and sustain multinational operations.

In analyzing the operational environment, the author refers to political, economic, social, infrastructure, and military factors. In addition, the study cannot ensure implementation of a recommended solution for filling a capability gap.

In the DOTMLPF (Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership, Policy, Facilities) process, the author only refers to the organization and training factors. The author will analyze the countries in alphabetical order.

Definition of Terms

Adriatic Charter Initiatives: “The Adriatic Charter partnership is an association proposed jointly by the presidents of Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia to President George W. Bush at the NATO Summit Prague in 2002. The organization named U.S.-Adriatic Charter 3 (A-3) signed in Tirana on May 2, 2003. In 2008, Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina joined this initiative and it was named Adriatic Charter 5 (A-5).”⁸ Albania and Croatia became members of NATO in 2009. Montenegro got an invitation in 2016 and will become a member this year. Bosnia and Herzegovina joined the Membership Action Plan (MAP) towards transformation to the NATO process.

Force Goals: “Those goals are primary tools for Partnership for Peace (PfP) Program, Allies and partners to implement aims and objectives and translated ideas into action.”⁹

Membership Action Plan: “The Membership Action Plan (MAP) is a criteria tool to prepare Partners that wish to join the alliance for the responsibilities and obligations of NATO membership. The MAP is a package of advice, assistance, and practical support

⁸ Ivan Grdešić, “US-Adriatic Charter of Partnership: Securing the NATO Open Door Policy,” *Politička misao* 41, no. 5 (2004): 104-106, accessed September 29, 2016, hrcak.srce.hr/file/33321.

⁹ Susan Pond, “Understanding the PfP Tool Kit,” *NATO Review*, accessed January 29, 2017, <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2004/partnership-forward/PfP-toolkit/EN/index.htm><http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2004/issue1/english/art2.html>.

that draws on the full range of Partnership activities and is modified to the individual needs of seeking Allies.”¹⁰

Smart Defence: Smart Defence is a new concept that NATO launched at the Chicago Summit, “In these times of austerity, each euro, dollar, or pound sterling counts. Smart Defence is a cooperative way of thinking about generating the modern defence capabilities that the Alliance needs for the future. In this renewed culture of cooperation, Allies are encouraged to work together to develop, acquire, operate and maintain military capabilities to undertake the Alliance’s essential core tasks agreed in NATO’s Strategic Concept. That means harmonizing requirements, pooling and sharing capabilities, setting priorities and coordinating efforts better. Smart Defence is a cooperative way of generating modern defence capabilities that the Alliance needs, in a more cost-efficient, effective and coherent manner. Allies are encouraged to work together to develop, acquire, operate and maintain military capabilities to undertake the Alliance’s core tasks.”¹¹

State Partnership Program: “The State Partnership Program (SPP) managed by the National Guard Bureau guided by Department of Defense foreign policy and executed by the state adjutants general in support of combatant commanders and U.S. chief of mission security cooperation objectives and Department of Defense policy goals. SPP is a great tool for building partnership capacity overseas.”¹²

¹⁰ Pond.

¹¹ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Smart Defence,” February 20, 2017, accessed September 21, 2016, www.nato.int/cps/cs/natohq/78125.htm.

¹² Division of International Affairs, National Guard Bureau, *The National Guard State Partnership Program Annual Report 2013* (Arlington, VA: National Guard Bureau,

The Western Balkans: “The Western Balkans (WB): Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia. Croatia became a member of European Union (EU) on 1 July 2013; Montenegro, Serbia, Macedonia, and Albania are suitable candidates. Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Kosovo are potential candidates.”¹³

Assumptions

These assumptions are based on current cooperation in the Western Balkans, legal frameworks in place, and those defined in strategic security documents.

1. The Western Balkan countries will remain committed to fulfilling their obligations for membership in Euro-Atlantic organizations (NATO and the EU).
2. Based on historical examples and their nation wills, the Western Balkan countries will contribute as appropriate and support with joint capabilities in future operations.
3. The Western Balkan countries share common threats and the same security environment.
4. Under Adriatic Charter initiatives, the Western Balkan countries are willing to work together to seek a common response.

January 2014), accessed December 10, 2016, <http://www.nationalguard.mil/Portals/31/Documents/J-5/InternationalAffairs/StatePartnershipProgram/SPP%20Annual%20Report%20FY13.pdf>, 1.

¹³ Lulezim Peci, Policy Paper 3/14, *Kosovo in the Security and Defense Context of the Western Balkans* (Kosovo: Kosovar Institute for Policy Research and Development, November 2014), 1.

5. The Western Balkan countries are willing to promote good community to work together for better prosperity.

Significance of the Study

First, the study addresses the security environment in the Western Balkans, national objectives, and strategic goals. Second, the study addresses the military capability gaps and potential capabilities that exist among the Adriatic Charter countries. Third, based on the shortfalls and potential capabilities, the author recommends the operational approach to close the capability gaps. Lastly, recommendations for further action and research focus on subjects that could have huge impact on the Western Balkans.

Summary

After the conflict ended in the late 1990s, the Western Balkan countries entered a new phase, beginning to work together to fulfill their commitment to the Euro-Atlantic institutions. The international community, the United States, and the EU began thinking about how to maintain security in the Western Balkans, and promote peace and prosperity for the future. As a continuation of the success story of the Baltic Cooperation (Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia), in 2003, the United States, with Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia established the Adriatic Charter Partnership.¹⁴ Under the framework of the A-3 and A-5, the Western Balkans planned and conducted joint exercises and improved cooperation and interoperability with each other. Furthermore, from 2005-2009, A-3 (Albania,

¹⁴ Grdešić, 104-106.

Croatia, and Macedonia), deployed a combined medical team in the NATO-led operation in Afghanistan.¹⁵ Hence, this was a test for these countries and it encouraged the United States and NATO to enlarge the cooperation and open the doors for integration. Because of this fruitful collaboration, the partnership was extended to Bosnia-Herzegovina and Montenegro; in 2008, the A-5 was formed.¹⁶ A year later, in 2009, Albania and Croatia became NATO members, while Macedonia was still waiting to get consensus from Greece for the name Macedonia. Based on the latest development, in 2016, Montenegro fulfilled the obligation and is becoming a member of NATO in 2017. In 2010, Bosnia and Herzegovina signed the MAP, which will help the country to undertake the transformation process. The integration process of Bosnia and Herzegovina stalled due to the different political views among the federation.

Overall, the integration process to Euro-Atlantic organizations is the strategic objective of the Western Balkan countries. There are concerns that this process has been hindered by political, economic, and security issues. The security environment of the Western Balkans, threats, and development of the defense capabilities to respond to the threats places an importance on the NATO membership.

Considering the previous research, works by scholars, and analysis the author will investigate the military capability gaps and challenges that exist among the Adriatic Charter countries. Second, based on the identified gap analysis and potential capabilities,

¹⁵ Ministry of Defence, Republic of Albania, “U.S - Adriatic Charter (A-5),” accessed May 11, 2017, <http://www.mod.gov.al/eng/index.php/security-policies/relations-with/international-and-regional-organization/90-adriatic-charter-a-5>.

¹⁶ Wikipedia, “U.S.-Adriatic Charter.”

the researcher will build the operational approach and lines of efforts that will contribute to close the gaps between the current environment and the desired end state. Cooperation and partnership will enable A-5 to enhance capabilities, improve interoperability, and sustain nations' common interests. Finally, in addition to enhancing the military capability development and security, cooperation plays an important role in improving social aspects in the region.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

The aim of this thesis is to study the challenges the countries in the Western Balkans face in building defense capabilities and meeting the NATO requirement promises to contribute to the collective defense. Integration and meeting NATO and EU requirements is the strategic goal of the A-5 countries. The A-5 countries face political, economic, and security challenges that have caused delays in fulfilling these objectives. The budget constraints and inability to meet the requirement of 2 percent of GDP on defense expenditures, has caused delays in developing military capabilities for contribution to collective defense. These circumstances, the common security environment, and the nations' interests of membership in Euro-Atlantic institutions has led to a search to address the military gaps, and enhance regional cooperation as a smart solution to develop military capabilities for a common response. In addition, the research will investigate the journey of the Western Balkans in developing their military capabilities based on strategic documents, the level of ambition, and NATO requirements. Significantly, the study examines how regional cooperation under the Adriatic Charter Partnership will address the common areas of collaboration for filling the capability gaps through a regional approach.

Many scholars for this research show that security environment in the Western Balkans after 2001, has changed dramatically, and countries are oriented towards cooperation in different areas. For these reasons, the scholars for this research are significant.

First, the Adriatic Charter countries in the Western Balkans share the same geographic location, along the Adriatic Sea, and are the bridge between the east and the west of the Europe. This geographic position, surrounded by the EU frontiers, makes this region important to access Europe. Second, the Adriatic countries in the Western Balkans share a common national interest membership in NATO and the EU. Third, it is in the U.S. and Europe interests to have a stable and self-sustained Western Balkans in the future. Scholars show that promoting regional cooperation among the Western Balkans will bring better peace, stability, and prosperity in the region. Historical examples of military cooperation have proven that a regional approach is the comprehensive solution to develop and achieve national objectives for collective defense. The goals above show the importance of addressing the challenges of the Adriatic Charter Partnership in the Western Balkans towards mutual defense and regional cooperation.

The thesis research relies on open sources published from many research institutes, annual progress reports published by NATO and U.S. Congress, and agreements and independent studies conducted by many followers from the region. The primary sources of information are policy papers; congressional research services reports; and strategic documents such as NSS, NMS, SDR, and white policy papers from the Western Balkan countries.

Furthermore, the Combined Arms Research Library provides updated documents and publications for the Western Balkans regarding military development and defense capabilities. “Jane’s Sentinel in Security Assessment: The Balkans” and military power Europe information groups assess all defense resources and capabilities of each Western Balkan country. Based on these assessments and threats, the United States has been

playing a significant role in shaping the security environment and reinforcing the importance of the Western Balkans' future to the United States and the EU.

Secondary sources of information include research from the Internet, different websites, and official websites of the ministries of defense of the Western Balkans: Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia. These sources provide the areas of military cooperation in the Western Balkans. They also provide an update on current initiatives in the Western Balkans and capabilities associated with them. In addition, these sources reflect the statements made by the Western Balkan civil-military leaders during different forums regarding regional cooperation.

The literature review is designed in three main domains of sources that author will analyze during the research. The first domain is the security environment in the Western Balkans, threats, and national interests. The second domain will evaluate military transformation, capabilities, contributions to joint operations, and gaps based on DOTMLPF. The third domain will examine the history of regional cooperation, current Western Balkan military initiatives, and address the possible area of collaboration among the Western Balkans with the aim of promoting cooperation for common response. In addition, based on NATO strategic guidance launched during the summits, the author builds the operational approach and lines of effort to close the gap in the Western Balkans, specifically in the A-5 partnership.

Regional Overview and Security Assessment

After the wars ended in the Western Balkans, the global community was interested and focused on the security environment there and encouraged the Western

Balkans to adopt liberal democracy and defense reforms, and to contribute to peace and stability in the international community.¹⁷ Of the seven countries of the Western Balkans, Albania and Croatia are NATO members, while others are seeking partnership. From the Euro-Atlantic perspective and geographic alignment, the Western Balkans region looks like a gap. Since the very beginning, NATO and the EU have gone through integration and enlargement to close this gap.¹⁸

The Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) *Study on the Assessment of Regional Security Threats and Challenges in the Western Balkans* provides findings on how security problems are addressed in the NSS or NMS of these countries, and to what extent they mirror the reality on the ground.¹⁹ In addition, DCAF argues that regional threats in the Western Balkans show many similarities in many aspects, which include organized crime, economic instability, corruption, state failures, and natural disasters.²⁰ Furthermore, DCAF argues that corruption is the most common threat in these countries, which affects only security, democratic reforms, and the rule of

¹⁷ Lidija Levkovska and Shane Thomas Franklin, “Constructivist Approach to Western Balkans’ Contribution towards Peace and Stability,” *Analytical Journal* 4, no.1 (June 2011): 1-16.

¹⁸ Ylber Sela and Bekim Maksuti, “The Social, Political, and Economic Changes in the Western Balkan: Managing Diversity,” *Seeu Review* 11, no. 2 (2015): 107-126, accessed October 19, 2016, <https://www.degruyter.com/downloadpdf/j/seeur.2015.11.issue-2/seeur-2015-0032/seeur-2015-0032.pdf>.

¹⁹ Istvan Gyarmati and Darko Stannic, eds., *Study On the Assessment of Regional Security Threats and Challenges in the Western Balkans* (Geneva, Switzerland: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), 2007), accessed September 29, 2016, www.dcaf.ch/content/download/35580/526377/file/gyarmati-stancic-study-western-ba.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 2.

law. In addition to DFAC, the Kosovar Institute for Policy Research and Development has evaluated the strategic documents of Western Balkan countries regarding the regional threat perception and management.²¹

In evaluating the nations' interests and objectives, DFAC emphasized that territorial integrity and membership in Euro-Atlantic institutions are common goals. Two Western Balkan countries are members of NATO (Albania and Croatia), and three nations are working towards becoming members. One important aspect of viewing regional cooperation is that all countries agreed that this approach would help them with development towards Europe. Another important part of the DFAC analysis is that all experts in Albania, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Croatia describe regional cooperation as a useful tool to enhanced development towards Europe.²²

From the framework theory of regional cooperation, in the book *The United Nations and Regional Security, Europe and Beyond*, Michael Pugh and Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu describe "regionalism as an activity at the regional level opposed at the global scale that contributes in somehow to the promotion of internal peace and security."²³ Regionalism itself has some shared objectives. Sovereignty is part of constitutional rights and at all times works contrary to regionalism.²⁴ As former United Nations (UN) Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali has commented, "The time of absolute

²¹ Peci, 9-16.

²² Ibid., 2.

²³ Michael Pugh and Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu, eds., *The United Nations and Regional Security, Europe and Beyond* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003).

²⁴ Ibid., 20.

and exclusive . . . has passed.”²⁵ As far as the noninterference policy remains, this does not delay regional groups from playing a role in enhancing regional security and building democracy.²⁶

Pugh and Singh Sidhu also explain, “bringing other actors or groups and setting the agenda raise hegemony issues, where they point out the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) —Liberia example where Nigeria dominated the process and provided the lion’s share of the ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG’s) military component.”²⁷ Hegemony issues are eluded by setting common principle rules and regulations where every country sticks to his promises.²⁸

Capacity is another common objective of regionalism, because small nations lacking resources, but acting regionally may bring support and expertise to the theater that big organizations such the UN or others might not have.²⁹ In general, these countries may apply complementary support, where each country develops specialized capabilities, which NATO called “niche capability.”³⁰

²⁵ Pugh and Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu, 22.

²⁶ Ibid., 23.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Ibid., 21.

²⁹ Ibid., 22.

³⁰ Colonel (Retired) Thimi Hudhra, “Defense Reform and NATO Integration: Lessons Learned from Albania” (Center for Defence Analyses, Training and Doctrine Command, Tirana, Albania, 2014), 6.

Another scholar also argues that after September 11, U.S. interest and policy has shifted to the war against terror in the Middle East and the United States is letting the EU deal with the Western Balkans.³¹ This policy has raised a little concern about the future of the Western Balkans with many unresolved issues and disputes, followed by an increase in Russia's involvement.

Transformation and Military Capabilities

This part will address the security improvements towards membership in NATO, military transformation, capabilities, and their contribution in multinational operations. After the wars ended and Yugoslavia disassembled, the Western Balkans entered a new phase, which most of the eastern countries experienced.³² During this phase, countries had to deal with revising their strategic documents; developing enhanced capabilities, modernizations and transformation; and reducing their armed forces. Another important objective was building “up an appropriate defense planning system, an adequate affordable resource allocation, and a proper and efficient budgetary system, clear, transparent and efficient procurement process, human management systems, appropriate social programs to deal with the adverse effects of reforms, public communications strategies, and effective decision-making process.”³³ The United States and NATO have

³¹ Bugajski.

³² Tobias Pietz and March Remillard, Brief 34, *Defence Reform and Conversion in Albania, Macedonia, and Croatia* (Bonn, Germany: Bonn International Center for Conversion, 2006), accessed September 29, 2016, <http://www.dcaf.ch/Publications/Brief-34-Defense-Reform-and-Conversion-in-Albania-Macedonia-and-Croatia>.

³³ Ibid., 1.

been driving factors for defense reforms in the Western Balkans. The U.S government has assisted with different programs to help these countries transform their military to active forces by providing funding and assisting with subject matter expertise. According to the Bonn International Center for Conversion, “NATO members usually refer to three ‘baskets’ of ideas of defense reform:”³⁴

- 1) Defense restructuring and reform of defense management practices and institutions;
- 2) Development of defense capabilities required to meet both new and traditional defense-related challenges; and
- 3) The action that will increase the countries’ ability to contribute to NATO-led crisis response operations.³⁵

To facilitate and ease NATO membership, the alliance issued different programs the aspirant countries had to go through, such as PfP, MAP, and the planning and review process.³⁶ These programs offered vision, guidance, and expertise to meet NATO requirements. Albania and Croatia officially became NATO members in 2009 and continued the transformation process until 2013 when they completed the integration process and become full NATO members.³⁷ In 2013, NATO also distributed a capability

³⁴ Pietz and Remillard, 2.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ David Price, *Report of the Sub-Committee on Future Security and Defence Capabilities: ‘Military Preparations of NATO Candidate Countries’*, NATO Parliamentary Assembly, November 5, 2004, accessed January 19, 2017, <http://www.nato-pa.int/default.asp?COM=245&LNG=0>.

³⁷ Wikipedia, “Enlargement of NATO,” Wikipedia Foundation, accessed April 28, 2017, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Enlargement_of_NATO.

package, “Blue Book,” to members with 49 capability targets.³⁸ Developing these capability objectives is a challenge because it requires considerable funds to develop resources, organization, and training. Montenegro expects to become a NATO member in 2017, making it the third country in the Western Balkans to become a member. The majority of the Montenegrin population supports membership. Only the Serbian minority opposes this objective. The NATO membership of Montenegro has been ratified with the 28 parliaments of the NATO members.³⁹ Although Macedonia was seeking membership, along with Albania and Croatia, and met the requirement, Greece rejected Macedonian membership in NATO due to the unsolved problem with its constitution name.⁴⁰ The integration process continues to be stalled. Greece has raised security concerns at NATO. There is no indication that this will be solved soon, unless the circumstances of the increased instability of the domestic situation have some influence.⁴¹ The latest declaration issued by both sides leaves a path for dialog that would bring Macedonia to NATO.⁴²

³⁸ Hudhra, “Defense Reform and NATO Integration,” 6.

³⁹ Wikipedia, “Accession of Montenegro to NATO,” Wikipedia Foundation, accessed May 28, 2017, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Accession_of_Montenegro_to_NATO.

⁴⁰ Wikipedia, “Enlargement of NATO.”

⁴¹ Fabrizio W. Luciolli, “NATO: ATA and the future of the Western Balkans,” Atlantic Treaty Organization, November 4, 2015, accessed November 23, 2016, <http://atahq.org/2015/11/nato-ata-and-the-future-of-the-western-balkans/>.

⁴² Ibid.

Bosnia and Herzegovina is another potential candidate for NATO from the Western Balkans. From the geographic position, the membership of Bosnia and Herzegovina will close the security gap along the coastline of the Adriatic Sea. NATO encourages the membership of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a potential contributing country, but the problem that causing delays to Bosnia and Herzegovina membership to NATO is internal and requires a consensus of “tripartition” of institutions.⁴³ Kosovo is the youngest country in the Western Balkans, declaring independence from Serbia in 2008. Croatia, Albania, Montenegro, and Macedonia recognized Kosovo’s independence. Serbia has opposed Kosovo’s independence and Bosnia and Herzegovina is the only neighboring country that has not recognized Kosovo’s independence. Although Kosovo has been independent for almost nine years, the security challenges are integration in a global community such as the UN, membership in Euro-Atlantic institutions, and forming its armed forces.⁴⁴ Kosovo is still acting under the UN resolution, and political dialog and cooperation with Serbia will improve the development of Kosovo’s status in the future.

Serbia is the only country that has chosen to be “military neutral,” in 2006 signed the PfP, and does not have ambitious to join NATO.⁴⁵ The relationship between Serbia and NATO has been intense in various areas. They established a partnership and training and education center for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Weapons

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Peci, 61.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 54.

(CBRN) in Crusevac.⁴⁶ In contrast to other countries in the region, Serbia enjoys a great relationship with Russia. Recently, Serbia and Russia signed a bilateral agreement in economic and military cooperation.

Membership in Euro-Atlantic institutions led the Western Balkans to adapt their national legislation and strategic security documents, primarily NSS, NMS, and SDR. In addition, raising the military contribution to NATO, UN, and EU-led operations drove the adaptation of national strategic documents.

The SDR and white policy papers are the most recent strategic documents that describe threats, capabilities, and the transformation process of the armed forces. The primary defense objective of every country in the Western Balkans is self-defense.⁴⁷ These goals drive the development of the military based on national targets and fulfillment of Euro-Atlantic institution obligations, in particular for contributing to NATO Article 5 operations.

To answer the primary research question, what are the capability gaps in the Western Balkans, the author must first use DOTMLPF analysis to address the capabilities they have in comparison with the objectives defined in each country's NMS, NSS, and SDR. "Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment: The Balkans," provides an executive summary, country overview, and analysis through the element of national power and operational variables (political, military, economic, social, information, and

⁴⁶ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "Partnership Training and Education Centers," accessed February 10, 2017, <https://www.act.nato.int/ptecs> Partnership Training and education centers: <https://www.act.nato.int/ptecs>.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 27.

infrastructure).⁴⁸ In addition, Jane's addresses the security environment of each country in the region, the latest status development, military capabilities, defense spending, equipment in service, procurement initiatives, training areas, and capability assessment to conduct combat operations. Moreover, Jane's provided a snapshot of the relationship of the Western Balkans with NATO, and regional initiatives. In addition, *The Military Balance 2016*, chapter 4, "Europe," and countries studies provide an enormous amount of information on development.

Another source of analysis of the Western Balkans defense transformation and capabilities is *The Military Balance 2016*, which addresses the importance of defense spending up to 2 percent of GDP and the participation of small countries in NATO's smart projects for contribution to collective defense. The Western Balkans has predicted an increase in defense spending. However, all of them seem to be far from reaching the 2 percent and this gap leads to finding a way to build better capabilities with affordable costs.

Adriatic Charter: A Regional Cooperation Approach for Common Response

The third part of the literature review will provide historical data of regional initiatives and the participation of the Western Balkan countries in NATO-led operations. Regional cooperation is becoming very popular nowadays. The Nordic Defense Cooperation, the Baltic Defense Cooperation (Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia), and the

⁴⁸ Jane's, "Albania," *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment-the Balkans*, IHS Markit, accessed May 31, 2017, [http://janes.ihs.com/Balkans/search?f=COUNTRY\(Albania\)&pg=1#](http://janes.ihs.com/Balkans/search?f=COUNTRY(Albania)&pg=1#).

Visegrad Group (Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Slovakia) are the most promising cooperations.⁴⁹

To address regional cooperation, the author must first analyze what determines regional cooperation. Justana Gotkowska and Olaf Osica explain that shared external and security strategy interests have provided a basis for regional cooperation between Visegrad Group members.⁵⁰ Financial constraints is another reason for regional cooperation, where defense expenditures have been declining or have not reach the required NATO target of the 2 percent level.⁵¹ An additional factor that leads to a regional approach is the increased complexity of the security environment and the unpredictability of the Russian security policy.⁵²

Referring to the Baltic cooperation, one the most significant finding is that this framework served as the great political ambition to NATO and getting external support for conducting training and increasing capabilities of armed forces.⁵³ The Western Balkan cooperation, Adriatic Charter Partnership, has many similarities with the Baltic cooperation countries such as financial constraints, reduced military, fulfillment of NATO capabilities, and threats.

⁴⁹ Justana Gotkowska and Olaf Osica, eds., *Closing the Gap? Military Cooperation from Baltic Sea to the Black Sea*, OSW Report (Warsaw, Poland: Center for Eastern Studies, December 2012), accessed November 20, 2016, http://aei.pitt.edu/58009/1/closing_the_gap_net_0.pdf, 5.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 8.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Ibid., 9.

⁵³ Ibid., 1.7.

The Adriatic Charter initiative is the most important framework in the Western Balkans. In 2003, the United States led Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia to establish the A-3.⁵⁴ In 2008, Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina joined and this association was named A-5. The aim of this initiative was to help southeast Europe countries to transform their military forces according to NATO standards and promote regional cooperation and stability.⁵⁵ In 2009, Albania and Croatia became NATO members, while Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Montenegro are working towards becoming NATO members. Based on the strategic security documents, SDR, white policy papers, analysis, and lessons learned from joint operations, there are some military capability gaps and shortfalls among these countries.

Finally, the author will analyze how regional cooperation can fill the capability gaps and address some smart projects that will enable the Western Balkan countries to fulfill national objectives and NATO requirements. The *Joint Operation Planning Process* doctrine provides guidance on how to assess current environment, frame the problem, define the desired end state, and build the operational approach to overcome the problem.⁵⁶

This doctrine is a foundation to build the research methodology and answer the research questions. Based on the strategic documents of the A-5 countries, they are

⁵⁴ Wikipedia, "U.S.-Adriatic Charter."

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Dale C. Eikmeier, *From Operational Art to Operations Plans, a Joint Planning Primer* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Department of Joint and Multinational Operations, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, June 27, 2012), 2-19.

developing their capabilities to answer threats and develop military capabilities to meet the NATO requirement. In analyzing the military capabilities and what is needed, force management provides guidance how to run the process. It starts with analyzing threats, objectives, and political direction.⁵⁷ The author uses the same approach and methodology in addressing the gaps and building a plan to bridge the gaps. Chapter 3 explains the research and methodology further, addresses how the author answers the research questions, and explains solving the problem statement.

⁵⁷ U.S. Army War College, *Army Force Management Model - How the Army Runs: A Senior Leader Reference Handbook, 2015-2016* (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2015).

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Introduction

The aim of this thesis is to address the military capability gaps that exist in the Western Balkan countries that have prevented them from achieving their strategic goals. Based on the identified gaps and potentials the author will build the approach, which will bridge the gaps and enable the Western Balkan countries to achieve the strategic goals.

The author uses the qualitative research methodology to analyze the data and resources. To answer the research questions, the qualitative research goes through some strategic and operational concepts that address problem solving. These frameworks and concepts are the Army Design Methodology, the Joint Operation Planning Process, Force Management, and the framework theory of regional cooperation (constructivist school of thought). The research methodology is displayed in figure 1.




Figure 1. Design Methodology and Operation Approach

Source: Created by author using information from Dale C. Eikmeier, *From Operational Art to Operations Plans, a Joint Planning Primer* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Department of Joint and Multinational Operations, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, June 27, 2012), 110.

In addition, the thesis analyzes the security assessment and the military transformation in the Western Balkans. The study will also demonstrate that the Western Balkan countries share a common security environment, mutual interests in Euro-Atlantic institutions, and consequences of military force reduction and budget constraints. Based on strategic documents (NSS, NMS, SDR), lessons learned from combined operations, and DOTMLPF analysis, the researcher will address joint enabling capability gaps and shortfalls. The study endorses regional cooperation as an approach to bridge the gap and

develop joint enabling capabilities. Furthermore, the regional approach will enhance peace, strength, and interoperability throughout the Western Balkans.⁵⁸

The joint planning doctrine provides a methodology and framework for solving the problem. The research will focus on four elements of the Joint Operation Planning Process. The first element is understand the current environment; second, what is the desired end state; third, define the problem; and fourth, build the approach on how to solve the problem.⁵⁹ To answer the primary research question; what are the military capability gaps in the Western Balkans and how will regional cooperation close the gap, the author will answer four secondary questions related to the Army Design Methodology and the Joint Operational Planning Process for problem solving, particularly in the Adriatic Charter cooperation.

First, the author will answer the question; what is the current environment in the Western Balkans? To understand the current environment in the Western Balkans, the author analyzed the countries' security perspective, threat perception, and challenges. SDR, NMS, and white policy papers provide the level of ambition in the Western Balkans, the nations' interests, vision, and development of their armed forces. From the strategical level, the author will investigate the Western Balkan countries' current condition of national instruments of power through analysis of the operational variables of political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure.

⁵⁸ Sani Demiri, Cvete Koneska, Sonja Risteska, and Andreja Bogdanovski, "Multinational Peace Support Operations, a Vital Element of the Western Balkan Contribution Towards Peace and Stability," *Analytical Journal* 4, no. 1 (June 2011), accessed December 1, 2016, http://analyticalmk.com/files/2011/01/j_07.pdf.

⁵⁹ Eikmeier, 18-27.

The second secondary question, what is the desired end state, relates to the level of ambition and strategic goals of the Western Balkans, which is integration in Euro-Atlantic institutions and contribution to common defense. The long-term development plan of the armed forces of the Western Balkans provides what capabilities these countries will develop in the future. Given that Euro-Atlantic integration is the highest priority, developing military capabilities and seeking a mutual response in common areas will lead these countries to build standing or ad-hoc framework cooperation.

The third question, which addresses framing the problem in the Western Balkans, will be analyzed based on national objectives compared with defense capabilities through DOTMLPF analysis. *The Military Balance 2016*, country data from NATO reports and Jane's assessments provide updated information on the defense capabilities and challenges that these countries face. In addressing the shortfalls, the author only refers to the organization (structures of armed forces of Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, and Montenegro) and educational training. Given the Adriatic Charter countries' strategic goal of full integration in Euro-Atlantic institutions, the author addresses the joint enabling capabilities that these countries need to develop to meet NATO requirements. The literature review showed that the challenges that A-5 countries have are strategic deployment; air surveillance and air defense; sustainment of deployed forces in multinational operations; developing Search and Rescue (SAR) capabilities to respond to natural disaster threats; and developing specialized capabilities for contributing to NATO operations, such as Explosive Ordnance Device (EOD), CBRN, and deployable medical services. Training and education in variety of areas is another challenge, along with interoperability throughout the region. In addition to identifying

these gaps during the analysis, the author also identified that some countries have potential capabilities. These countries can possibly lead in a certain area by contributing these special capabilities. In this case, author tries to mitigate the gaps among the Western Balkans.

Regional cooperation under A-5 and other initiatives integrated to the Western Balkans answers the question, how will regional cooperation through A-5 partnership in the Western Balkans fill the gap? In the past, under the A-5 framework, Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia deployed a medical team to Afghanistan.⁶⁰ Currently, under the A-5 framework, Albania, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Montenegro have deployed training teams to a regional command north Afghanistan. In “Multinational Peace Support Operations, a Vital Element of the Western Balkan Contribution Towards Peace and Stability,” Sani Demiri, Cvete Koneska, Sonja Risteska, and Andreja Bogdanovski write, “The participation in NATO, EU, UN-led mission represents an avenue that Western Balkan countries employ to demonstrate their willingness to export stability and concurrently develop capacities and capabilities up to par to ensure interoperability and compatibility with allies and partners.”⁶¹ Based on author analysis, the critical factor for regional cooperation remains the reduction of the military budget, limited resources to advance in the transformation process, and building required capabilities. To define the common areas and capabilities, the author use DOTMLPF analysis to identify common areas of cooperation, which each of these countries can contribute to developing military

⁶⁰ Ministry of Defence, Republic of Albania, “U.S - Adriatic Charter (A-5).”

⁶¹ Levkovska and Franklin, 5.

capabilities. In “‘Smart Defense’: A Smart Approach for the Balkan Region,” Dr. Leonard Demi and Colonel Thimi Hudhra address some of the areas that the Western Balkans can use for a smart defense solution.⁶² Furthermore, this analysis is in synchronization with current NATO strategic concepts for smart defense and a common response. As Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen noted, “Pooling and sharing are vital if we want to develop our military know-how and capabilities. And NATO is best placed to identify and connect nations that have similar needs but not enough money to build a capability on their own.”⁶³

Finally, the framework theory of the “constructivist” school of thought facilitates regional cooperation as an adequate tool for socializing regional actors towards peace and prosperity.⁶⁴ According to Levkovska and Franklin, “Constructivist assumptions reinforce our argument of sustained interest for contribution towards peace and stability

⁶² Dr. Leonard Demi and Colonel Thimi Hudhra, “A Smart Defence Approach for the Balkans,” Ministry of Defense, Republic of Albania, Tirana, Albania, accessed September 29, 2016, https://www.academia.edu/7603042/A_SMART_DEFENCE_APPROACH_FOR_THE_BALKANS.

⁶³ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Building Security in an Age of Austerity” (Keynote Speech by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen at the 2011 Munich Security Conference, February 4, 2011), last updated February 5, 2011, accessed March 18, 2017, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_70400.htm.

⁶⁴ Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 1. Basic tenets of Constructivism “that the structures of human association are determined primarily by shared ideas rather than material forces, and that the identities and interests of purposive actors are constructed by these shared ideas rather than given by nature.”

that countries in the region develop throughout their different ways of interaction with the international community and more specifically with the alliance.”⁶⁵

⁶⁵ Levkovska and Franklin, 8.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Introduction

The aim of the study is to address the military gap among the Adriatic Charter countries in the Western Balkans, and obstacles and challenges that these countries are facing to fulfill their strategic goals. To analyze the gap, the author uses the DOTMLPF, refer to the organization and training, the author tries to identify the potential capabilities and common areas of cooperation, for building shared capabilities for collective defense. These areas will lead to building an operational approach and lines of effort for achieving the end state, and strategic goals of the Adriatic Charter countries. The concept methodology is in figure 1 in chapter 3.

In this chapter, the author will analyze the security environment in the Western Balkans, threats, and challenges. The research will focus on the areas that answer the primary and secondary questions as described in chapter 3 to define the military gaps and Adriatic countries' approach to bridge these gaps. The primary research question is the driving mechanism for the secondary questions, which provide a framework to answer the questions of "what" and "how."⁶⁶ The author will analyze the current environment in the Western Balkans, involving political, military, economic, and social factors. After assessing the current situation, the author will provide an assessment of threats and challenges that the Western Balkans is facing on their path to integration in the Euro-

⁶⁶ The primary research question: what are the military gaps in the Western Balkans and how will regional cooperation close the gap?

Atlantic institutions. First, the author analyzes the current environment in the Western Balkans, focusing on operational variables such as political, military, economic, and social. The secondary question will analyze the threat perception and challenges in the Western Balkans, mainly described in their strategic documents. The third secondary question will address the nations' interests and levels of ambition of the Western Balkan countries. This question also defines the desired end state. The primary sources for answering this question are strategic documents, implementation plans, and works from other scholars from strategic study centers in the region. The ultimate important objective of the Western Balkans, and specifically the A-5 countries, is integration in Euro-Atlantic institutions (NATO and EU), and for those who are already members (Albania and Croatia) to transform and develop "capability targets."⁶⁷ The next step is answering the fourth secondary question, which will include a current update on military transformation and examination of the military capabilities using the DOTMLPF analysis. During this assessment, the author will refer to the A-5 partnership, which includes Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, and Montenegro. During this analysis, the author will address two important aspects. The first aspect is the common areas of cooperation; and the second aspect is the potential capabilities of each country that would be appropriate to use jointly. Finally, the researcher will analyze what determines regional cooperation as a comprehensive approach to close the military gap. This will also answer the second part

⁶⁷ Colonel (Retired) Thimi Hudhra, "Evolution of Albanian Security and Defence Concept After the 90-Ies" (Research Paper, National Center for Security and Defence, Tirana, Albania, July 2014), accessed May 28, 2017, https://www.academia.edu/9234412/Evolution_of_Albanian_Security_and_Defence_Concept_after_the_90-ies, 12.

of the primary research question of how the A-5 countries will be able to fulfill their strategic goals and contribute to a collective defense.

Threat Assessment

The critical factors driving the requirement to develop defense capabilities in the Western Balkans are threats to the nations' security and fulfillment of the NATO requirement for a collective defense. The path to integration in Euro-Atlantic organizations led the Western Balkan countries to review their strategic documents and foreign policies. In reviewing the strategic documents of each country, the DFAC publication notes that the Western Balkans "pays more attention to the new threats than tradition one."⁶⁸ In evaluating their strategic documents, the most common threats in the Western Balkans are:

- Organized crime;
- Economic instability;
- Corruption;
- State failures;
- Natural disasters;⁶⁹

Based on the current development and analysis, the security threats are "clustered in Conventional and WMD, Political, Non-conventional and transnational, weak governance, and Emergency/disaster categories."⁷⁰

⁶⁸ Gyarmati and Stančić, 2.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Peci, 16.

In the strategic documents of the Western Balkan countries, such as NSS and NMS, conventional threats are viewed in almost the same way, but with differing descriptions.⁷¹ “For instance, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia view it as almost nonexistent, Albania and Kosovo believe there will be a significant decline, Croatia and Montenegro consider the threat as greatly reduced, and Serbia views it as just reduced.”⁷²

Another common threat for the Western Balkans is proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, which is more important to NATO and EU than in the region.⁷³ All the countries in the region assess it as a risk that might cause destabilization in the region, “the threats of Political nature, nationalistic, ethnic and religious, those of state formation and contested and undermined borders.”⁷⁴ For instance, “Serbia targets Kosovo, including the Kosovo Security Force, as a direct threat to the existing mode of regional arms control which threatens the balance in the region.”⁷⁵

Furthermore, common threats are “non-conventional and transnational threats,” where all Western Balkan countries share the same view and reaction.⁷⁶ Lastly, given the fact that the Western Balkans went through a long transition, all of the countries except

⁷¹ Peci, 9.

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Ibid., 10.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

for Croatia have weak economies, inept governance, corruption, a failure to implement rule of law, and a failure to build strong institutions.⁷⁷

All of these threats have had a significant impact on the security of the Western Balkans and delayed the full integration process. It is necessary to address these threats in conjunction with the operational variables of the strategic environment in the Western Balkans region.

Regional Overview and Assessment of Strategic Environment in the Western Balkans Cooperation

After the wars ended in the Western Balkans, “the security environment” the global community was focused on the situation and inspired the Western Balkans to adopt “liberal democracy,” defense reforms and be able to “contribute to peace and stability” in the international community.⁷⁸ After September 11, the focus of the U.S policy shifted from the Western Balkans to the Middle East.⁷⁹ From the U.S perspective, Eastern Europe was more important. This resulted in the establishment of two U.S military bases in Rumania and Bulgaria, and these countries joined the coalition campaign in Iraq and Afghanistan to broaden counterterrorism efforts.⁸⁰ According to Janusz Bugajski:

⁷⁷ Gyarmati and Stančić, 16-17.

⁷⁸ Levkovska and Franklin.

⁷⁹ Pierre Tristam, “The U.S. and the Middle East Since 1945 to 2008,” ThoughtCo., updated May 2, 2016, accessed May 2, 2017, <https://www.thoughtco.com/us-and-middle-east-since-1945-2353681>.

⁸⁰ Bugajski, 1.

although the United States has not completely detached itself from the post-Yugoslav region, from the white house perspective the Western Balkans have evolved into a primary responsibility of the EU, although America plays a supportive role. Growing EU involvement is understood through the reduction of U.S troop presence, the increase of EU security instruments, EU-incentivized structural reforms, and a road map toward eventual union accession.⁸¹

Many experts and analysts from the Western Balkans and U.S representatives continued to caution former President Barack Obama to stay involved with the unresolved issues in the Western Balkans. They argued that the EU cannot solve these difficult issues alone, and this is a potential threat for growing instability in the region.⁸²

From the geographic perspective, the Western Balkans consists of seven countries, or put another way, the former Yugoslavia plus Albania. From the Euro-Atlantic standpoint, Croatia is the only member that belongs to the EU and NATO, while Albania is only a member of NATO. Looking the Euro-Atlantic map in figure 2, the Western Balkans remains a gap from a NATO security perspective. To have a better understanding of the environment, the author is going to analyze the political, military, economic, and social environment of the Western Balkans.

⁸¹ Bugajski, 1.

⁸² Ibid.



Figure 2. Map of the Western Balkans

Source: Wilton Park, “Map of Western Balkans,” 2013, accessed February 21, 2017, <https://www.wiltonpark.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/Western-Balkans.jpg>.

Political Assessment

Albania

The goal of EU membership motivates the Albanian Government to conduct the necessary reforms to meet the EU standards. This has been a slow process. The government of Albania has undertaken a series reforms to fight against corruption, illegal

activities, and implement law enforcement measures in the public services.⁸³ Since July 2014, Albania has been candidate member of the EU. The strategic goal of Albania in foreign policy is solid membership in Euro-Atlantic organizations, primarily NATO (they became a member in 2009), and the EU.⁸⁴ After the wars ended in the former Yugoslavia, Albania's relationships with its neighboring countries has improved a lot. The only concern regarding relationships with their neighbors is "A maritime border dispute with Greece, which does carry the potential of Greece using the veto to block the country's EU membership."⁸⁵

Bosnia and Herzegovina

The Dayton Peace Accord signed on December 14, 1995, constituted founding of two entities, "the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) and Serb Republic (Republika Srpska)."⁸⁶ The ethnic partitions and government coalitions impede important organizational and legal reforms, and dominate the political spectrum in Bosnia and

⁸³ U4 Expert Answer, "Albania: Overview of Corruption and Anti-Corruption," 2009, accessed February 20, 2017, <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/57a08ab0ed915d3cfd0008b2/expertanswer-289.pdf>.

⁸⁴ Jane's, "Albania," 2.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ Jane's, "Bosnia-Herzegovina," *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment-the Balkans*, IHS Markit, accessed December 31, 2017, [https://janes.ihs.com/Balkans/search?f=COUNTRY\(Bosnia-Herzegovina\)&pg=1#](https://janes.ihs.com/Balkans/search?f=COUNTRY(Bosnia-Herzegovina)&pg=1#), 16. According to the Dayton Agreement, these entities legislate on most of their domestic matters such as finance, taxation, and business development and they control their budgets for infrastructure, healthcare, and education. The state-level government is responsible for foreign policy, trade, and defense. The Dayton Peace Accord also established the office of the high representative to oversee the peace implementation process with powers to enact necessary legislation and dismiss public officials.

Herzegovina.⁸⁷ In the book *The Breakup of Yugoslavia and the War in Bosnia*, Carole Rogel mentioned, “Unlike the other republics, it had neither a majority of the national group nor a majority religious community.”⁸⁸ Regardless of the nationalities and religions, maintaining a foreign relationship is the primary responsibility of the federal government of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Bosnia and Herzegovina chose their ambassadors based on the national census and they should come from the three major nationalities. Like other countries in the region, Bosnia and Herzegovina’s strategic goal is membership in Euro-Atlantic institutions. The failure of the UN mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina led to the need for protection from NATO⁸⁹ As Jasmina Katica remarked in her research, “Looking to the past and hoping for a better future, Bosnia and Herzegovina has made a logical choice: to seek membership in the NATO alliance in order to enjoy the benefits of collective defense.”⁹⁰ Bosnia and Herzegovina joined the PfP program in 2006 (with Montenegro and Serbia), and in 2016, Bosnia and Herzegovina signed a request for EU membership.

In foreign affairs policy, Bosnia and Herzegovina are enjoying a good relationship with NATO and the EU, which culminated in joining the NATO MAP in 2010, and

⁸⁷ Jane’s, “Bosnia-Herzegovina,” 16.

⁸⁸ Carole Rogel, *The Breakup of Yugoslavia and the War in Bosnia* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1998), 30.

⁸⁹ Jasmina Katica, “NATO Membership for Bosnia and Hercegovina: Obstacles and Challenges” (Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, December 2008), accessed December 16, 2016, www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a493953.pdf.

⁹⁰ Ibid., 1.

receiving visa liberalization within the EU in 2008.⁹¹ Since 2004, the political influence of the United States in Bosnia and Herzegovina has declined, particularly when U.S troops were pulled out and replaced by the EU-led peacekeeping force.⁹² After 2000, the relationship between Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina focused on economic development, such as energy and transportation.⁹³ Furthermore, in 2008, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro joined the A-5 as a way to speed up the process of NATO accession and promote good community. Finally, Bosnia and Herzegovina is the only neighboring country besides Serbia that has not recognized Kosovo's independence.⁹⁴

Croatia

The Republic of Croatia is in the northwest of the Balkan Peninsula. It has an area of 56,542 square kilometers with 1,777 kilometers of coastline on the Adriatic Sea.⁹⁵ Croatia is the only Western Balkans country that is a member of both Euro-Atlantic organizations, NATO (2009) and the EU (2013).

⁹¹ Katica, 26.

⁹² Jane's, "Bosnia and Herzegovina," 48.

⁹³ Ibid., 49.

⁹⁴ Enver Hoxha, "Kosovo Feels Russia's Heavy Hand, Via Serbia," *New York Times*, April 13, 2017, accessed April 20, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/13/opinion/kosovo-feels-russias-heavy-hand-via-serbia.html?_r=0.

⁹⁵ Military Technology, "Croatia," January 2013, accessed March 23, 2017, <http://web.b.ebscohost.com.lumen.cgscarl.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=3&sid=c4bbf640-84d8-4abe-aa8c-32a3f936bccd%40sessionmgr102&hid=118,114>.

The current constitution adopted on December 22, 1990, enabled Croatia to enjoy a multi-party democracy.⁹⁶ The president is the head of state and the government serves as the U.S. equivalent of the executive branch. The process of integration to Euro-Atlantic institutions enabled Croatia to adapt national legislation accordingly. The relationship with its neighbors, particularly Slovenia, influenced the EU integration process. These issues are mainly disputes and maritime borders on the Adriatic Sea, which they claim to solve through “international arbitration.”⁹⁷ Bosnia and Herzegovina dispute that Croatian investment in the Peljesac Peninsula hinders Bosnia-Herzegovina’s access to the Adriatic Sea.⁹⁸ Serbia and Croatia have accused each other of genocide. This issue brought them to the International Court of Justice at The Hague. Additionally, the recent refugee crisis of Middle East migrants coming from Serbia to Croatia to reach Europe has raised debate between the two countries.⁹⁹ However, Croatia remains the leading country in the Western Balkans in regards to economic development and has shown a commitment to support the Western Balkan countries’ membership in the EU.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁶ The World Factbook, “Croatia,” Central Intelligence Agency, last updated May 2017, accessed March 23, 2017, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/hr.htm>, 1.

⁹⁷ Jane’s, “Croatia,” *Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment-the Balkans*, IHS Markit, accessed May 31, 2017, [https://jan.es.ihs.com/Balkans/search?f=COUNTRY\(Bosnia-Herzegovina\)&pg=1#f=&q=Croatia](https://jan.es.ihs.com/Balkans/search?f=COUNTRY(Bosnia-Herzegovina)&pg=1#f=&q=Croatia), 9.

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ Ibid., 10.

¹⁰⁰ European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, “Investing in the Western Balkans,” Regional Forum, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development Headquarters, London, February 24, 2014, accessed January 7, 2017, <http://www.ebrd.com/downloads/news/wb-brochure.pdf>.

Macedonia

The Republic of Macedonia is in the southwest of the Balkan Peninsula, neighboring Greece, Bulgaria, Albania, Kosovo, and Serbia, with an area 25,333 square kilometers.¹⁰¹ Like other countries in the region, the Republic of Macedonia is a multiethnic and religious country. In 1991, Macedonia peacefully separated from Yugoslavia, but its constitutional name faced Greece objection. This issue has blocked Macedonian accession to the Euro-Atlantic institutions.¹⁰²

Recently, the political situation in Macedonia has been unstable. Although Macedonia was the first country in the Western Balkans to become an EU member (2005), the process has not advanced much. According to The World Factbook assessment on Macedonia: “The country still faces challenges, including overcoming the political crisis, fully implementing Ohrid Framework Agreement, resolving the outstanding name dispute with Greece, improving relations with Bulgaria, halting democratic backsliding, and stimulating economic growth and development.”¹⁰³

From the regional cooperation perspective, Macedonia is working closely with the other Western Balkan countries in different areas including economic, military, and

¹⁰¹ Jane’s, “Macedonia,” *Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment-the Balkans*, IHS Markit, accessed May 31, 2017, [https://janes.ihs.com/Balkans/search?f=COUNTRY\(Bosnia-Herzegovina\)&pg=1#f=COUNTRY\(Macedonia%2c+Former+Yugoslav+Republic+of\)&q=macedonia](https://janes.ihs.com/Balkans/search?f=COUNTRY(Bosnia-Herzegovina)&pg=1#f=COUNTRY(Macedonia%2c+Former+Yugoslav+Republic+of)&q=macedonia), 1.

¹⁰² The World Factbook, “Macedonia,” Central Intelligence Agency, accessed January 15, 2017, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/mk.html>.

¹⁰³ Ibid.

social. Outside the Western Balkans, Macedonia has cooperation with strategic partners such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, Turkey, and Russia.¹⁰⁴

Montenegro

The Republic of Montenegro is in the west of the Balkan Peninsula bordered by Albania to the southwest, Kosovo to the east, Serbia to the northeast, Bosnia and Herzegovina to the northwest, and the Adriatic Sea coastline in the west. The capital city is Podgorica. Montenegro is the smallest country in the Western Balkans, separated from Serbia through referendum, and in 2007 established its constitution. As the other countries in the A-5, the strategic goal of Montenegro is membership in the Euro-Atlantic institutions.¹⁰⁵

The government, represented by ruling party has been a strong supporter of Montenegro's Euro-Atlantic organization by taking the necessary steps to adapt their institution and laws accordingly.¹⁰⁶ In December 2015, NATO invited Montenegro to join the alliance. The initiation raised political and public concerns and the opposition party demanded a referendum on whether to join the alliance.¹⁰⁷ In foreign affairs, Montenegro has a healthy relationship with Croatia, NATO, the EU, and its neighbors.

¹⁰⁴ Jane's, "Macedonia." 56.

¹⁰⁵ Jane's, "Montenegro," *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment-the Balkans*, IHS Markit, accessed May 31, 2017, [https://janes.ihs.com/Balkans/search?f=COUNTRY\(Bosnia-Herzegovina\)&pg=1#f=COUNTRY\(Montenegro\)&q=montenegro](https://janes.ihs.com/Balkans/search?f=COUNTRY(Bosnia-Herzegovina)&pg=1#f=COUNTRY(Montenegro)&q=montenegro).

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., 44.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., 46.

Moreover, Russia is important to Montenegro's economy, and from the beginning recognized Montenegro's independence.

Economic

Albania

According to Jane's, "Albania should experience relatively strong medium to long-term growth, but from low base."¹⁰⁸ Albania is projected to see economic growth of 3.5-4.0 percent annually until 2025.¹⁰⁹ It is significant that during the financial crisis in Europe and its neighboring countries, Albania managed quite well and maintained economic growth.¹¹⁰ The World Bank now lists Albania "as a lower-middle-income country," and it will take a while to reach comparable European standards.¹¹¹ The strategic goal, EU membership, enabled Albania to undertake tremendous reforms and forced the country to "accelerate judicial, political, and administrative reforms, helping to raise Albania's international profile, attract capital, and encourage workers in the underground economy to enter the official label market."¹¹²

¹⁰⁸ Jane's, "Albania," 5.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁰ European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, "Investing in the Western Balkans."

¹¹¹ Jane's, "Albania," 5.

¹¹² Ibid.

According to a *Wall Street Journal* assessment of the Fraser Institute index and the Heritage Foundation, Albania has low-level economic freedom compared to most NATO members, but slightly greater than or equal to seven NATO members.”¹¹³

The primary source of Albanian’s economy is from agriculture, minerals, oil, natural gas, and tourism. The Albanian unemployment rate is quite high (estimated at 17.5 percent in 2014), and it is labeled as an informal economy.¹¹⁴ The strategic project for economic development is the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline. This energy project will increase the role of Albania in the region as the gas supplier to the Western Balkans. In addition, “TAP via Albania will connect Albania to Greece and Italy, although Albania is slated to serve as a transit state for gas supply being sent westwards.”¹¹⁵ Based on Jane’s data from the International Monetary Fund, the majority of Albania’s trade remains with Italy, Greece, Kosovo, Turkey, Macedonia, Croatia, China, Germany, the United States, Spain, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Russia.¹¹⁶

Bosnia and Herzegovina

According to Jane’s, the economic development in Bosnia and Herzegovina stays moderate with projected growth up to 4 percent in the medium term, with an

¹¹³ Joseph A. Christoff, *NATO Enlargement: Reports on Albania and Croatia Respond to Senate Requirements, but Analysis of Financial Burdens is Incomplete* (Washington, DC, U.S. Government Accountability Office, September 2008), accessed December 10, 2016, <https://books.google.com/books?isbn=1437910726>, 18.

¹¹⁴ Jane’s, “Albania,” 8.

¹¹⁵ Ibid., 9.

¹¹⁶ Ibid., 8-9.

unemployment rate around 27 percent, and potential trade partners in neighboring countries and the EU.¹¹⁷ According a World Bank business report for 2016, Bosnia and Herzegovina is listed in 79th place globally and ranked in second to the last place, ahead of Albania. Although Bosnia and Herzegovina submitted its EU membership application in 2016, it is too early to know when Bosnia and Herzegovina will meet the EU requirements.¹¹⁸ Potential contributors to the economy remain metal products, forestry, food, drink, textiles, leather, and tourism.¹¹⁹

Approximately 70 percent of the trade market is oriented to EU countries for exporting goods and markets, mainly with Germany, Italy, Croatia, Slovenia, and Austria.¹²⁰ Finally, the EU membership of Bosnia and Herzegovina largely depends on the political and economic reforms of the political spectrum and entities, who are more interested in reacting to demands of the international community than focusing on real reforms, which will affect the economic situation in the country.¹²¹

Croatia

Croatia is the only the Western Balkans country enjoying EU membership by increasing foreign investment and trade market with EU members.¹²² According to The

¹¹⁷ Jane's, "Bosnia-Herzegovina," 23.

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

¹¹⁹ Ibid.

¹²⁰ Ibid., 22-23.

¹²¹ Ibid.

¹²² European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, "Investing in the Western Balkans."

World Factbook data for 2016, Croatia's GDP per capita is \$22,400. The GDP growth rate continues to increase with 1.9 percent.¹²³ The main contributors to the economy are services and tourism at 69.2 percent, industry at 26.6 percent, and agriculture at 4.2 percent.¹²⁴ EU membership status has enabled Croatia easy access to import and export trade, particularly with EU members such as Italy, Germany, Slovenia, and Hungary.¹²⁵ Given the geographic position along the Adriatic Sea and cultural heritage, Croatia is an attractive tourist country in the region with significant income for the economy.

Macedonia

Macedonia has made significant progress in developing the economy and undertaking many economic transformations, by improving "the country's standing in global rankings such as the World Bank Doing Business reports."¹²⁶ Although the economy has shown progress, unemployment is at 30 percent, labor force skills are insufficient, and the economic sector has reduced loans to private enterprises.¹²⁷ The key economic sectors are agriculture, tourism, and services. Accession to the EU will motivate Macedonia to continue economic and political reforms. The key and vital

¹²³ The World Factbook, "Croatia," 1.

¹²⁴ Ibid.

¹²⁵ Ibid.

¹²⁶ U.S. Agency for International Development, "Macedonia: Economic and Growth and Trade." accessed March 24, 2017, <https://www.usaid.gov/macedonia/economic-growth-and-trade>, 1.

¹²⁷ Ibid.

economic sectors are mining metal production, chemicals, medication, tobacco, light textile, and tourism.¹²⁸

Montenegro

The country's policy toward Europe helped Montenegro improve their financial situation and attract foreign investment in many vital economic sectors with very low taxes. According to Jane's, using euro as the national currency helped Montenegro manage inflation, but has challenged Montenegro in facing European competitiveness in international trade.¹²⁹ In 2006, Montenegro established the Stabilization and Association Agreement with the EU, became an EU candidate in 2010, and expects to be an EU member in 2022. Although Montenegro has moved forward with privatization, the country still faces an informal economy with an unemployment rate at 15 percent, corruption, inadequate diversification, and inept managerial capacity.¹³⁰ The fundamental pillars of the economy remain utilities at 44 percent, tourism at 22 percent, metals at 11 percent, and food products at 8 percent. The main trade partners are Serbia, Croatia, Malta, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Greece, Belarus, Kosovo, and China.¹³¹

¹²⁸ Jane's, "Macedonia," 43.

¹²⁹ Jane's, "Montenegro." 11.

¹³⁰ Ibid.

¹³¹ Ibid.

Social

Albania

Albania is about 95 percent national Albanian and has a minor population of Greeks, Serbs, Roma (Gypsies), Romanians, and Bulgarians.¹³² The official language is Albanian, which is Indian-European derived from Illyrian. Romans, Greeks, and Ottomans affected the religion of Albania when they conquered the country. Under the Ottoman Empire, the majority of the population converted from Catholicism to Muslim.¹³³ Albania religions were banned during the Communist era until 1990 when the country changed to a democratic system.¹³⁴ Currently, Albanians enjoy religious freedom, but the most of the population is atheistic. However, based on CultureGrams data, 70 percent of Albanians are Muslim, 20 percent are Orthodox, and 10 percent are Catholic. Another important fact is that people from different religions live in great harmony.¹³⁵ People value education as an important instrument for the future of their youth. The pupils in Albania begin school at age six and are required to finish high school.¹³⁶ The government provides free medical care, but private health care services are available at people's own expense.

¹³² CultureGrams, "Republic of Albania," accessed August 21, 2016, www.culturegrams.com.

¹³³ Ibid., 4-5.

¹³⁴ Wikipedia, "Religion in Albania," Wikipedia Foundation, 2017, accessed March 6, 2017, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Religion_in_Albania.

¹³⁵ CultureGrams, 6.

¹³⁶ Ibid.

Bosnia and Herzegovina

Bosnia and Herzegovina is multiethnic with a diversity of religions and cultures. According to Jane's, the ethnic background of the population in Bosnia and Herzegovina is Muslim/Bosniak at 48.3 percent, Serbs at 37.1 percent, Croat at 14.3 percent, and others at 2.3 percent.¹³⁷ However, these national entities have slight differences among them, particularly consisting of culture and religion. Bosnia and Herzegovina is a multi-religious country, which consists of Muslims at 40 percent, Orthodox at 31 percent, Catholic at 15 percent, Protestant at 4 percent, and others at 10 percent.¹³⁸ The languages spoken are Bosnian, Serbian, and Croatian.¹³⁹ Like other countries in the region, during the Communist era, people were atheist, but after 1990, religious beliefs and practice returned. The medical infrastructure, with the help of the international community has improved. The rural areas lack medical service so they use the services in Zagreb and Beograd.¹⁴⁰

Croatia

Based on Jane's assessment (census in 2011), the Croatian population was estimated at 4,284,889 with 90.4 percent identified as ethnic Croats, 4.4 percent as Serbs

¹³⁷ Jane's, "Bosnia-Herzegovina," 52.

¹³⁸ Military Technology, "Bosnia and Herzegovina," January 2013, accessed March 23, 2017, <http://web.b.ebscohost.com.lumen.cgsccarl.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=3&sid=c4bbf640-84d8-4abe-aa8c-32a3f936bccd%40sessionmgr102&hid=118>, 110.

¹³⁹ Ibid.

¹⁴⁰ Jane's, "Bosnia-Herzegovina," 52.

(the largest minority), and the remaining population is Bosniak, Hungarian, Slovene, Czech, and Roma.¹⁴¹ The majority of the population is Roman Catholic at 86.3 percent, Orthodox at 4.4 percent, and Muslim at 1.5 percent. The official language is Croatian; however, people also speak English, German, Italian, Serbian, and other languages.¹⁴²

Macedonia

The Republic of Macedonia is a multiethnic country with diverse culture and religions. Based on the last census, 64.18 percent of the country is Macedonian, 25.17 percent are Albanian, and the remainder is Turks, Romanian, Serbs, and Bosniak. The majority of the population, 67 percent is Eastern Orthodox, and 30 percent are Muslim.¹⁴³

According to Jane's, the Orthodox Church play a major role in the Macedonian ethnic society by struggling to preserve national identity. The official language is Macedonian, written in Cyrillic, which is close to Bulgarian and related to the Slavic language, while ethnic Albanians speak Albanian.¹⁴⁴

Montenegro

Montenegro is a multiethnic country. It has a population of 622, 159 (estimated in 2015), and an area of 13, 812 square kilometers. The majority of the people are Montenegrins at 45 percent, Serbs at 28 percent, Bosnians at 8.1 percent, Albanians at 4.9

¹⁴¹ The World Factbook, "Croatia," 1.

¹⁴² Ibid.

¹⁴³ Jane's, "Macedonia," 51.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., 53.

percent, and Croats at 0.5 percent.¹⁴⁵ Montenegrin is the official language in the country. The majority of the Montenegro population is Orthodox Christian, Catholic, and a considerable amount of Muslims.¹⁴⁶

Military

The transformation process of the Western Balkan military forces has been oriented towards the fulfillment of NATO accession and a response to current and future threats. The defense budgets of the Western Balkan countries are relatively small compared to the other countries in Western Europe and NATO members. Although Albania and Croatia are NATO members, they are far from reaching the NATO target of the 2 percent level of defense spending. The United States and NATO stimulated participation in NATO-led multinational operations as the driving factor for the integration process of the A-5 countries in the Western Balkans. To answer the question, what are the military gaps in the Western Balkans, the author will chronologically address the military capabilities based on DOTMLPF analysis. From the DOTMLPF analysis, the author addresses organization and training for Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Croatia, and Montenegro.

¹⁴⁵ Wikipedia, "Montenegro," Wikipedia Foundation, accessed March 25, 2017, <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Montenegro>.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid.

Organization

Albania

The mission of the Albania Armed Forces (AAF) is, “Safeguarding the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country, supporting and protecting the civilians in time of peace, crisis and war, contributing to the peace and security in the region and beyond, and supporting or engaging in the process of Euro-Atlantic integration and cooperation and other regional initiatives in the field of security.”¹⁴⁷ The AAF consists of three main components: land, navy, and air. The president is the commander in chief. The AAF structure is designed by the SDR and NATO requirements, which is threat and capability based. In 2013, Albania fulfilled the integration process with NATO and accepted capability packages, which consists of 44 capability targets. The NATO membership and transformation process converted Albania from security consumer to security provider. As the director of the National Center for Security and Defense stated:

Fulfillment of the strategic goal of membership in the alliance is not the end of our efforts. This does not mean that the integration process is closed. In this context, the key question of my motivation is how to become a respected member of the alliance, with both benefits and the obligations stemming from the membership. This quality transformation of the concept of the defense of the country will be associated with complex reforms in the security and defense.¹⁴⁸

¹⁴⁷ Republic of Albania, Armed Forces, “Mission,” accessed March 20, 2017, <http://www.aaf.mil.al/english/index.php/shtabipergjithshem>.

¹⁴⁸ Colonel Thimi Hudhra, Deputy Director of National Centre for Security and Defense, “A Defense Planning system for Albania under the NATO Collective Defense” (Case Study, Tirana, 2013).

The transformation process of the AAF has been in line with strategic documents and NATO requirements. According to the SDR, until 2020 Albania will maintain 8,500 active personnel consisting of Army (Land Force Command Support Command and Training and Doctrine Command), Navy Command, and Air Force Command.¹⁴⁹

Table 1. Albanian Armed Forces				
Personnel	Total Strength	Army	Air Force	Navy
Active Personnel	9,250	7,300	700	1,250
Reserve	5,000	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown

Source: Jane's, "Albanian Army," *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment-the Balkans*, IHS Markit, accessed April 4, 2017, <https://janes.ihs.com/Balkans/Display/1769106>.

In 2015, Albania launched the *Long-Term Development Plan of the Armed Forces 2016-2025*, which forecasts the primary objectives, capabilities, modernization, and reaching 2 percent of GDP in defense spending.¹⁵⁰ Based on the latest developments from the NATO Summit in Brussels, Albania might increase defense spending and reach the 2 percent defense spending quota earlier than expected.

¹⁴⁹ Jane's, "Albania," 47.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 42.

Table 2. Defense Budget of the Albanian Armed Forces				
Fiscal Year	2016	2015	2014	2013
Constant 2014 USD million	112.6	119.4	140.7	188.4
% GDP	1.1	0.9	1.2	1.8

Source: Jane's, "Albanian Army," *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment-the Balkans*, IHS Markit, accessed April 4, 2017, <https://janes.ihs.com/Balkans/Display/1769106>.

Based on the SDR, Albania designated a unit for combating terrorism and a Special Forces battalion in the Land Force Command performs this task.¹⁵¹ Albania is working to fulfill the level ambition, for contribution to the full spectrum of combat operation with one light infantry battalion, a special operations task group, and in support of these elements, Albania is developing enabling capabilities to support this operation with combat support and combat service support capabilities.¹⁵² These capabilities include an EOD platoon, a Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC) team, Medical Maneuver, and a CBRN platoon. According to the current structure, Albania does not have fixed wing air capabilities, which limits their deployment or they must rely on multinational and interagency partners. The Combat Support Battalion supports the land force units with combat support with one artillery battery, one CBRN company, and an engineering company for providing direct engineering support.

¹⁵¹ Ministry of Defence, Republic of Albania. *Strategic Defense Review of the Republic of Albania* (Tirana, Albania: Ministry of Defence, March 2013), accessed September 20, 2016, www.mod.gov.al/qksm/english/strategicreview.pdf.

¹⁵² Ibid., level of ambition, II.4.

After 9/11, Albania joined a U.S-led coalition in warfighting against international terrorism in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Albanian contribution has been significant, relatively high compared to the size of the Albanian military. Albania's main contribution is to continue to take part in the International Security Assistance Force and Resolute Support operations in Afghanistan, and since 2003, more than 3,000 troops have deployed.¹⁵³ In developing CBRN capability as national objective, Albania has developed a modernization project for equipping this company according to the Table of Equipment. In addition, the Office of Defense Cooperation is assisting with developing CBRN capabilities as a NATO capability target, as well as a national and regional asset as the first responder in CBRN threats. Developing CBRN capacities in the Western Balkans has also been imperative for the EU. Based on the "Eu CBRN COE Project 14 'Provision of Specialized and Technical Training to Enhance the First Response Capabilities':"

The Initiative is funded by the European Commission and implemented in cooperation with the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) and the European Commission Joint Research Centre (JRC). The European External Action Service is also involved in the follow-up of the initiative. The initiative is developed with the technical support of relevant international and regional organizations, the EU Member States, and other stakeholders, through coherent and effective cooperation at the national, regional and international level. The initiative involves 51 countries in 8 regions of the world.¹⁵⁴

¹⁵³ Jane's, "Albanian Army," *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment-the Balkans*, IHS Markit, accessed April 4, 2017, <https://janes.ihs.com/Balkans/Display/1769106>, 1.

¹⁵⁴ United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute., "Eu CBRN COE Project 14 'Provision of Specialized and Technical Training to Enhance the First Response Capabilities'," United Nations, May 26, 2015, accessed April 4, 2017, http://www.unicri.it/news/article/2015-05-26_EU_CBRN_CoE_Project_1.

The Air Force component has 700 personnel consisting of rotary wing capabilities that focus more on providing airlift for conducting emergency crisis response operations, medical evacuations, and executive transportation.¹⁵⁵ In fulfilling the NATO requirement, Albania founded the Air Surveillance Centre in 2010 and as a result became a member of the Combined Air Operation Centers.¹⁵⁶ Indeed, Albania does not have combat aircraft capabilities and airspace security is through a multinational solution with NATO partners.¹⁵⁷

Another important component of the AAF is the Navy Command. The mission of the Navy is “Providing and maintaining the sovereignty of the Republic of Albania maritime space in cooperation with other structures of the Armed Forces, the law enforcement at sea in cooperation with state institutions with interests in the maritime area.”¹⁵⁸ The Navy forces total “1900 located in two maritime districts Durres the Vlora, and consists of maritime surveillance centre, diving centre, hydrographic service, a naval shipyard, and navy training school.”¹⁵⁹

Overall, the AAF as a joint force (land, navy, and air), offer a possibility to conduct a broad spectrum of operations on a small scale.¹⁶⁰ As a NATO country, Albania

¹⁵⁵ Jane’s, “Albania,” 47.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid.

¹⁵⁸ Republic of Albania, Armed Forces, “Missions and Tasks: Navy Structure,” accessed April 4, 2017, <http://www.aaf.mil.al/english/index.php/naval-force>.

¹⁵⁹ Jane’s, “Albania,” 61.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid., 55.

has cooperation with different NATO members and partners in the region. The primary capabilities are light infantry units; Special Forces; commandos in the Land Force Command; and enabling capabilities such as EOD, engineering, SAR, CBRN, and medical.¹⁶¹

Bosnia and Herzegovina

Bosnia and Herzegovina consists of three ethnic groups. Each of them has its own army but they are unified in single command.¹⁶² Since 2001, Bosnia and Herzegovina have been working for NATO membership. The first step was signing the PfP.¹⁶³

The defense reform has transformed the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina (AFBiH) into a small joint force with some rotary wing capabilities. Based on Jane's, the total armed forces are:

¹⁶¹ Ibid., 55-56.

¹⁶² Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, *Brochure of the Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina* (Sarajevo: Public Affairs Office, Bosnia and Herzegovina, April 2011), accessed September 29, 2016, www.mod.gov.ba/files/file/maj_2011/bosura%20eng%20mail.pdf.

¹⁶³ Ibid., 4.

Table 3. Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina				
Personnel	Total Strength	Army	Air Force	Navy
Active Personnel	5,500	5,000 ¹	500	N/A
Reserve	5,000	5,000	N/A	N/A
1. Includes 1,000 civilian staff.				

Source: Jane's, "Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina," *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment-the Balkans*, IHS Markit, accessed May 31, 2017, [https://janes.ihs.com/Balkans/search?f=COUNTRY\(Bosnia-Herzegovina\)&pg=1#](https://janes.ihs.com/Balkans/search?f=COUNTRY(Bosnia-Herzegovina)&pg=1#), 41.

According to the Jane's data for 2009, the defense budget of Bosnia and Herzegovina has declined slightly.¹⁶⁴ As other countries in the region, Bosnia and Herzegovina went through an economic crisis. The defense budget from 2013 was constant at 1.3 percent.

Table 4. Defense Budget of the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina					
Fiscal Year	2017	2016	2015	2014	2013
Constant 2014 USD million	187.95	169.04	163.5	190.9	195.26
% GDP	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3

Source: Jane's, "Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina," *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment-the Balkans*, IHS Markit, accessed May 31, 2017, [https://janes.ihs.com/Balkans/search?f=COUNTRY\(Bosnia-Herzegovina\)&pg=1#](https://janes.ihs.com/Balkans/search?f=COUNTRY(Bosnia-Herzegovina)&pg=1#), 41.

¹⁶⁴ Jane's, "Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina," *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment-the Balkans*, IHS Markit, accessed May 31, 2017, [https://janes.ihs.com/Balkans/search?f=COUNTRY\(Bosnia-Herzegovina\)&pg=1#](https://janes.ihs.com/Balkans/search?f=COUNTRY(Bosnia-Herzegovina)&pg=1#), 41.

According to *The Military Balance 2016*, the AFBiH consists of three main components: land, air, and combat service and support elements.¹⁶⁵ In 2015, the EU-led mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina signed an agreement with the AFBiH to assist with training the armed forces from 2016-2017.¹⁶⁶ In addition, through the security cooperation program, Foreign Military Sales, the United States has been assisting in developing a mine action program and improvised explosive device capabilities.¹⁶⁷ The Bosnia and Herzegovina contribution to the NATO-led operation in Afghanistan has proven that Bosnia and Herzegovina can bring NATO great assets and capabilities to NATO. Therefore, NATO encourages and will support NATO membership for Bosnia and Herzegovina. According to the Jane's, "the Armed Forces of BiH now are not capable of undertaking individual conventional combat operation on any scale."¹⁶⁸ Removing the obsolete equipment and managing army properties has been a challenge due to the amount of resources and manpower required to maintain this equipment.

The transformation process of Bosnia and Herzegovina has been oriented towards Euro-Atlantic memberships. According to a white policy paper, "The establishment of

¹⁶⁵ International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 2016: The Annual Assessment of Global Military Capabilities and Defence Economics* (London, UK: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2016), accessed September 29, 2016, <https://www.iiss.org/en/publications/military%20balance/issues/the-military-balance-2016-d6c9>, 80.

¹⁶⁶ Headquarters, European Union Force, *Operation Althea: European Union Force in BiH, Information Booklet* (Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina: Public Affairs Office, Headquarters, European Union Force, March 2017), accessed March 21, 2017. http://www.euforbih.org/eufor/images/pdfs/EUFOR_Info_Booklet.pdf.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid., 80.

¹⁶⁸ Jane's, Bosnia-Herzegovina," 8.

the Bosnia and Herzegovina Ministry of Defence, Joint Staff and Operational Command is the most evident result of defence reform, as these institutions shall contribute directly to the operational capability and functioning of the Armed Forces of BiH, enable their participation in programmes such as the Partnership for Peace.”¹⁶⁹ The transformation of security forces has been driven by NATO requirements and national objectives to respond to current and future threats. The NATO involvement in Bosnia and Herzegovina was successful for maintaining peace and stability in the post-Dayton period, which led to the replacement of the NATO Stabilisation Force with EU forces to conduct stability operations.¹⁷⁰ The AFBiH, consists of army and air components, which includes air defense capabilities. Based on the *Brochure of the Ministry of Defense and the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina*, the total strength of defense forces is 10,500 personnel. In addition, Bosnia and Herzegovina will maintain 5,000 personnel as a reserve.¹⁷¹ Like Macedonia, the Bosnia and Herzegovina federation does not have naval units. Civil control is main factor for developing armed forces. As described in the brochure, the two main commands in the AFBiH are Operational Command and Support Command.¹⁷² To perform their mission, AFBiH consists of these branches: “Infantry, Artillery, Artillery and Rocket Units of the Air Defense, Armored Mechanized Units,

¹⁶⁹ Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, “Defence White Paper of Bosnia and Herzegovina,” Sarajevo, June 2005, accessed March 11, 2017, http://www.bbn.gov.pl/ftp/dok/07/BIH_Defence_White_Paper_Bosnia_Herzegovina_2005.pdf.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid., 2.

¹⁷¹ Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, *Brochure of the Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina April 2011*.

¹⁷² Ibid., 13.

Aviation, Engineering, Communications, Atomic, Biological and Chemical Defense, Electronic Surveillance and Defense, Air Surveillance and Alarming, and Military Intelligence.”¹⁷³ As the main combat unit, “each infantry brigades consist of three infantry battalions, and artillery battalion, a reconnaissance company, signal platoon, and military police platoon.”¹⁷⁴ The enabling capabilities such as “engineers, signals, artillery, logistics, and aviation are being organized as single regiments that will eventually have a multi-ethnic composition.”¹⁷⁵

The air force and air defence componet of Bosnia and Herzegovina is very small in size and capabilities. The mission is “to provide air support and transportation to ground forces with an increasing emphasis placed on disaster relief and other civil assistance missions,”¹⁷⁶ and particularly conducting reconnaissance, SAR tasks, and training with EU forces located in Butmir, Sarajevo.¹⁷⁷

The increase of contribution to multinational operations, expresses the will of Bosnia and Herzegovina to join NATO as a security provider to the international community. In addition to NATO-led operations, Bosnia and Herzegovina is participating

¹⁷³ Ibid., 14.

¹⁷⁴ Jane’s, “Bosnia-Herzegovina – Army,” *Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment-the Balkans*, IHS Markit, accessed March 8, 2017, <https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/1767058>, 1.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid.

¹⁷⁶ Jane’s, “Bosnia-Herzegovina - Air Force,” *Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment-the Balkans*, IHS Markit, accessed March 9, 2017, <https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/1766966>, 1.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid.

in UN missions. According to the *Peacekeeping Contributor Profile*, Bosnia and Herzegovina can contribute with “deployable troops which could consist of an explosive ordinance disposal platoon, military police platoon and 1-2 light infantry platoons.”¹⁷⁸ However, the financial and combat service support units are not available to sustain their contribution.¹⁷⁹ Based on the recent deployment experience, logistic support of the A-5 countries has been provided by the lead nation, which also has operational control over the forces.¹⁸⁰ The strategic deployment and redeployment has been ensured through bilateral cooperation with strategic partners.

Croatia

Since 1990, Croatia has transformed and developed professional armed forces, and in 2009 become a NATO member. The transformation process conducted was based on NATO guidance, the SDR, and the *Long-Term Development Plan* with 18,000 personnel.¹⁸¹ The Croatian Armed Forces (CAF) has been a significant contribution to NATO in Afghanistan, participating in different training missions such as combat and police training, as well as in Iraq by donating weapons to Iraqi forces “through NATO

¹⁷⁸ Denis Hadzovic, “Peacekeeping Contributor Profile: Bosnia and Herzegovina,” Providing for Peacekeeping, August 11, 2014, accessed November 24, 2016, <http://www.providingforpeacekeeping.org/2014/08/11/peacekeeping-contributor-profile-bosnia-and-herzegovina>, 1.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid.

¹⁸¹ Jane’s, “Croatia,” 3.

Training Mission-Iraq.”¹⁸² Under A-5 framework, Croatia is leading a combined training team of the A-5 countries in Mazar e Sharif, Afghanistan.

The CAF has made significant progress in developing their capabilities, with contributions to international security, and has the largest military of the A-5 countries. Based on data from Jane’s the CAF consists of 16,000 active and 21,000 reserve forces. The main components of the CAF are in table 5.¹⁸³

Table 5. Croatian Armed Forces					
Personnel	Total Strength	Army	Air Force	Navy	Other
Active Personnel ¹	16,000 ²	7,900	1,470	1,450	5,180 ³
Reserve	21,000 ⁴	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The number provided also includes about 1,510 civilians. 2. To be reduced to 15,000 by 2018. 3. Includes armed forces staff units, personnel in the Croatian Military Academy, the Support Command, and the Special Operations Forces Command (Zapovjedništvo Specijalnih Snaga: ZSS). 4. Out of this total, 20,000 personnel is the intended mobilizational reserve, while 1,000 is the contractual reserve. 					

Source: Jane’s, “Croatian Armed Forces,” *Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment-the Balkans*, IHS Markit, accessed March 2, 2017, <https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/1301856>, 1.

¹⁸² Ibid.

¹⁸³ Ibid., 1.

Like Albania and Montenegro, the CAF consists of three services: land, air, and navy. The development of armed forces culminated in 2009 when Croatia, along with Albania, became a NATO member. In October 2012, Croatia finished the integration process within NATO.¹⁸⁴ The strategic documents, the 2013 SDR and the *Long-Term Development Plan 2015–2024*, provide clear direction for the development of the CAF. The main capabilities of CAF are Army units, while Navy and Air Force are limited in capabilities.¹⁸⁵ Based on Jane's evaluation, Croatia:

still lacks a NATO-standard Joint Forces Command HQ with responsibility for integrated planning and operations. However, Hungarian staff officers are advising the Croatian General Staff Planning Department on how to proceed. The CAF is now a smaller and more mobile organization and the chain of command has been streamlined. Operational command and control (C2) is currently vested in the General Staff.¹⁸⁶

In addition, the *Long-Term Development Plan*, approved by parliament on December 12, 2014, determine CAF priorities as follows:

1. Force size is to stand at 15,000 active military personnel. In addition, there will be 400 cadets, 2,000 civilian personnel, up to 1,000 voluntary conscripts (total annual quota), and 21,000 members of the reserve (20,000 mobilization and 1,000 contractual reserve);
2. Approximately 50% of the personnel will be deployable abroad with 10% of active duty ground forces ready to be deployed sustainably for a longer period of time (up to 1,000 members ready for military operations abroad, with financial means for sending and upkeep for 200 personnel provided in the defence budget. The remainder to be financed through the general state budget if needed);
3. Naval forces will have the ability to protect the maritime area of the country and support land forces in joint operations; also capabilities for participation

¹⁸⁴ Jane's, "Croatia," 99.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid., 106.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid., 113.

in NATO, EU, and UN missions outside the Adriatic will be developed and exercised;

4. The air force will protect and maintain control of Croatian airspace, have the ability to support ground forces in joint operations; and deploy a helicopter force to missions abroad on a sustainable basis. Therefore, 40% of the air forces will have the ability to participate in operations outside the territory of Croatia, with approximately 8% of active personnel ready to be deployed on a sustainable rotational basis;
5. CAF capabilities are to be enhanced by extensive training programmes and acquisitions of additional equipment (advanced artillery, aerial and naval vessels, communications);
6. Military education to be expanded and brought into line with the civilian system of higher education, with dual-recognized degrees awarded (in line with the EU Bologna process).¹⁸⁷

As a full member of both Euro-Atlantic organizations, Croatia is participating in different military initiatives under NATO and EU framework. In 2016, one hundred CAF soldiers are deployed in Afghanistan, operating in Kabul and Mazar e Sharif in the Resolute Support mission. Croatia is the lead nation for A-5 framework composed of Albania, Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Montenegro. To implement the SDR, fulfill its objectives, and develop NATO requirements by the projected deadline, CAF needs considerable funds. According to Jane's, the funds allocated are not sufficient and they are far from achieving the 2 percent of GDP (see table 6).

¹⁸⁷ Jane's, "Croatian Armed Forces," 1.

Table 6. Defense Budget of Croatian Armed Forces								
Fiscal Year	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Constant 2016 USD Billion	0.664	0.591	0.589	0.583	0.572	0.591	0.61	0.639
Constant 2016 Local Billion	4.873	4.335	4.316	4.274	4.192	4.333	4.506	4.688
Budget per Manpower (Constant 2016 USD)	42,844	39,409	39,234	38,851	38,103	39,386	40,960	42,612
% GDP	1.46	1.30	1.28	1.25	1.20	1.20	1.22	1.23

Source: Jane's, "Croatian Armed Forces," *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment-the Balkans*, IHS Markit, accessed March 2, 2017, <https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/1301856>, 1.

As shown in table 6, meeting the NATO commitment for defense spending seems to be far from 2020. Moreover, the CAF ambition to participate in different initiatives, under NATO and EU framework, requires cooperation with other countries to share capabilities. According to the Chief of General Staff of CAF, the level of ambition of CAF is:

1. Maintaining current level of Defense Budget in next three years;
2. Country defense with all available potentials and relying on collective defense;
3. Equipment and training for participation in operations;
4. NATO Capability Targets as a tool, and Participation in NRF and EUBGs.¹⁸⁸

¹⁸⁸ General Drago Lovric, "The Evolution of the Croatian Armed Forces in the Face of 21st Century Security Challenges," 59th NATO Parliamentary Assembly

The capability targets are generic in nature, and the requirements for development are defined in the NATO BI-SC Capability Codes and Statement, Deployment and Redeployment. These capabilities consist of developing capabilities for conducting wide range operation. To ensure strategic deployment, Croatia became a member of the Movement and Coordination Center Europe.¹⁸⁹ The NATO Response Forces deployment requires high readiness capabilities to move on very short notice. Ensuring the readiness and strategic lift is a challenge for Croatia as well.

The Navy is another component of CAF, with capabilities inherited from the former Yugoslavia. Due to the long coastline along the Adriatic Sea, the Navy plays an important role in protecting the sea and conducting multinational maritime operations. The main capabilities are “fast attack missiles, patrol vessels, and Mine-warfare vessels”¹⁹⁰ According to Jane’s, the Navy consist of these units:

1. Flotillas, located in Split, composed of ship division, support division, and mine ware far section;
2. Coast guard, composed of 1st Coast Guard Division (Split), and 2nd Coast Guard Division (Pula);
3. Coastal Surveillance Battalion (Split);
4. and Training center.¹⁹¹

Meeting, Defence and Security Committee, Dubrovnik, Croatia, 2013, accessed September 21, 2016, <http://www.nato-pa.int/shortcut.asp?FILE=3354>, 1.

¹⁸⁹ Wikipedia, “Movement Coordination Centre Europe,” Wikipedia Foundation, accessed March 10, 2017, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Movement_Coordination_Centre_Europe, 1.

¹⁹⁰ Jane’s, “Croatia,” 116.

¹⁹¹ Ibid.

The *Long-Term Development Plan* of CAF and the SDR are calling for upgrading naval multirole systems, answering current threats in the region and beyond, and looking for smart defense solutions. Another significant capability in the CAF is the Air Force and air defense system. The headquarters is in Zagreb and they provide control authority to all of the air defense subunits.¹⁹² The completion of the NATO integration process enabled Croatia to coordinate their operations with the Combined Air Operations Centre in Torrejon, Spain.¹⁹³ Jane's assesses the air defense system "with limited jet fighter capabilities. However, it does possess an adequate combat helicopter force and a substantial aerial firefighting contingent."¹⁹⁴ The CAF consider air policing and air defense as a challenge that should be addressed with a regional solution.¹⁹⁵

Macedonia

The Macedonian Armed Forces (ARM) are relatively young, funded in 1995 after Macedonia separated from Yugoslavia. The ARM consists of two main services: army and air force. From the beginning, Macedonia's goal was to build an army structure according to Euro-Atlantic standards. Macedonia has been enjoying a "peaceful ethnic" existence in the region, but this peace broke down in 2001 when the civil war between ethnic Albanians (National Liberation Army) and Macedonian Security Forces started in

¹⁹² Jane's, "Croatia - Air Force," *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment-the Balkans*, IHS Markit, accessed March 1, 2017, <https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/1766972>.

¹⁹³ Ibid.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁹⁵ Lovric, 7.

the northwestern part of Macedonia.¹⁹⁶ The war lasted six months until the international community set a ceasefire and established the Ohrid Framework Agreement, which granted more civil rights and representation to ethnic Albanians in Macedonia.¹⁹⁷ The Adriatic Charter framework and NATO open door policy, along with Croatia and Albania, helped the transformation process of the ARM to be more professional and compatible with allies.

In 2008 at the NATO Summit in Bucharest, Romania, Macedonia, Albania, and Croatia were invited to join the alliance. However, Greece rejected Macedonia's membership due to a name dispute, while Albania and Croatia became NATO members in 2009.¹⁹⁸

The armed forces are in table 7.¹⁹⁹

Table 7. Army of the Republic of Macedonia				
Personnel	Total Strength	Army	Air Force	Navy
Active Personnel	8,100	7,300	800	N/A
Reserve	1,800	1,800	N/A	N/A

Source: Jane's, "Macedonian Armed Forces," *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment-the Balkans*, IHS Markit, accessed December 20, 2016, <https://janes.ihs.com/Balkans/Display/1301906>, 1-3.

¹⁹⁶ Pietz and Remillard.

¹⁹⁷ Jane's, "Macedonia."

¹⁹⁸ The World Factbook, "Macedonia."

¹⁹⁹ Jane's, "Macedonian Armed Forces," *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment-the Balkans*, IHS Markit, accessed December 20, 2016, <https://janes.ihs.com/Balkans/Display/1301906>, 2.

Defense spending, shows that the ARM cannot reach the NATO benchmark 2 percent level of spending (see table 8).

Table 8. Defense Budget of the Army of the Republic of Macedonia						
Fiscal Year	2016	2015	2014	2013	2012	2011
Constant 2014 USD million	105.03	102.17	127.57	123.24	133.3	128.1
% GDP	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.2	1.3

Source: Jane's, "Macedonian Armed Forces," *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment-the Balkans*, IHS Markit, accessed December 20, 2016, <https://janes.ihs.com/Balkans/Display/1301906>, 1-3.

The primary strategic document that addresses the development of the ARM is the "White Paper on Defence," which represents the "National Security and Defense Policy."²⁰⁰ This document addresses threats, objectives, and capabilities that Macedonia is developing in line with the strategic goal of membership in Euro-Atlantic organizations. The ARM consists of three main commands: Joint Operational Command, Special Forces Regiment, and Training and Doctrine Command.²⁰¹ The Joint Operational Command consists of:

²⁰⁰ Minister of Defence, Republic of Macedonia, "White Paper on Defence," Ministry of Defence, Skopje, Macedonia, September 2012, accessed January 20, 2017, <http://www.morm.gov.mk/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/WHITE-PAPER-OF-DEFENCE.pdf>.

²⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 30-38.

1. Mechanized Infantry Brigade (combat force);
2. Air Force Brigade;
3. Logistics Brigade;
4. Military Police Battalion;
5. Signal Battalion;
6. Active Reserve Forces.²⁰²

Besides the Joint Operational Command, which provides joint combat capabilities, the Special Operations Regiment is the primary unit responsible for conducting “special operations, conventional and non-conventional operations, independently or in co-action with other ARM units in peacetime, crisis or war.”²⁰³ The main capabilities of the Special Operations Regiment are a command company, a Special Forces battalion, a Ranger battalion, and a logistic support company, which enables the Special Operations Regiment to conduct stand-alone operations.²⁰⁴ Based on Jane’s assessment, the Air Force brigade:

is a component command of the joint Army of the Republic of Macedonia (ARM), which provides air support and air transport, performs limited surveillance of national airspace, and operates mobile air defence systems. The brigade has participated in peace support operations in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) and supports civil authorities with search-and-rescue (SAR), firefighting, and medical evacuation (medevac) of civilians during natural disasters and catastrophes. These roles are purely defensive in nature, with structure and training tailored for counter-insurgency operations. As such, the

²⁰² Ibid.

²⁰³ Ibid

²⁰⁴ Ibid., 39-40.

brigade is trained for air-to-ground combat activities, mainly to strengthen and assist the land force components in carrying out their basic military tasks.²⁰⁵

In developing organizations, the ARM always has to consider the strategic environment and NATO guidance, which is mostly reflected in the SDR. The long-term development plan reflects the ways and means of strategy (SDR), and achieving the strategic goal. Like other countries in the region, air policing and air defense is a challenge for the ARM. However, Macedonia is considering exploring a regional solution for developing these capabilities.²⁰⁶ The Air Force has airlift capabilities for long distances. Strategic allies have provided for the deployment of troops in multinational operations.

Montenegro

From the start as an independent country, Montenegro established a professional army, which consists of ground forces, navy, air forces, and Special Forces. Unlike Macedonia, when Montenegro broke from Yugoslavia, it did not inherit military capabilities from Yugoslavia.²⁰⁷ According to the SDR of Montenegro, the total military force will be 1,950 active military and 1,050 reserves, and this force will be professional

²⁰⁵ Jane's, "Macedonia - Air Force," *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment-the Balkans*, IHS Markit, accessed December 20, 2016, <https://janes.ihs.com/Balkans/Display/1301906>, 1.

²⁰⁶ Ibid., 2.

²⁰⁷ Wikipedia, "Montenegro," 1.

and capable of defending the country.²⁰⁸ Montenegrin contributions in fighting against terrorism has increased significantly, and they are part of the A-5 training teams in Regional Command North Afghanistan.

The Montenegrin strategic goal of integration in Euro-Atlantic institutions guided transformation process of their defense system to a small force with capabilities to address the security challenges. Using information from Jane's and the 2013 SDR of Montenegro, the size of the Armed Forces of Montenegro (AFMNE) are in table 9.

Table 9. Armed Forces of Montenegro				
Personnel	Total Strength	Army	Air Force	Navy
Active Personnel	1,950 ¹	1,450 ²	150	350
Reserves	1,050	450	N/A	600
1. By 2018, the armed forces strength will be reduced to 1,800. 2. The figure includes around 240 civilians.				

Source: Jane's, "Montenegro Armed Forces," *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment-the Balkans*, IHS Markit, accessed March 27, 2017, <https://janes.ihs.com/Balkans/Display/1301759>, 2.

Regarding the defense budget, contrary to the other A-5 countries, Montenegro shows an increase since 2011. The figures are in table 10.

²⁰⁸ Ministry of Defence, Montenegro, *Strategic Defence Review of Montenegro* (Podgorica, Montenegro: Ministry of Defence, 2013), accessed March 23, 2017, <http://www.gov.me>.

Table 10. Defense Budget of the Armed Forces of Montenegro						
Fiscal Year	2016	2015	2014	2013	2012	2011
Total Defense Spending (USD millions)	43.57	48.66	45.39	50.86	54.19	50.27
Total Defense Spending (% of GDP)	1.2	1.2	1.0	1.09	1.02	0.91

Source: Jane's, "Montenegro Armed Forces," *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment-the Balkans*, IHS Markit, accessed March 27, 2017, <https://janes.ihs.com/Balkans/Display/1301759>, 2.

The 2013 SDR defines the ambition of Montenegro to develop a joint force with small-scale combat capabilities. In addition, Montenegro views the NATO guidance for developing collective defense and pooling resources as a comprehensive solution in the future.²⁰⁹ A recent development for Montenegro was "the signing of the NATO Accession Protocol in May 2016, and is expected to be ratified by each member state by mid-2017."²¹⁰ The main task of the land forces units is developing capabilities for combating current and future threats, as well as conducting small-scale stability operations. A recent development is, "The second Light Infantry Company, which is declared by the Montenegro Armed Forces for the NATO Pool of Forces, achieved SEL-1 level. In the next four years, the unit is to obtain NEL-2 level and become fully

²⁰⁹ Jane's, "Montenegro Armed Forces," *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment-the Balkans*, IHS Markit, accessed March 27, 2017, <https://janes.ihs.com/Balkans/Display/1301759>, 1.

²¹⁰ Ibid.

interoperable with NATO units.”²¹¹ The second component of the AFMNE is the Air Force, “the small fleet of operational Gazelle helicopters form the core of Montenegro’s military aviation capability and are tasked with limited search and rescue (SAR), firefighting, coastal patrol, and other tasks in support of the civil administration. They could also be involved in limited combat operations. However, given its size and equipment fielded, the force’s effect on combat environment would be limited.”²¹² The current air components are able to conduct very limited tasks because the current technology is unable to sustain them.²¹³ According to Jane’s, “The lack of combat systems and air defense resources (artillery, missile systems, and aircraft), helicopters, and modern radars for air surveillance is especially evident.”²¹⁴ These capability gaps exist in other neighboring countries as well. This led these countries to seek a regional solution.

Like Albania and Croatia, Montenegro has navy component capabilities. Although Montenegro inherited large fleet from the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, most of these assets are not mission capable.²¹⁵ Based on Jane’s, the

²¹¹ Ibid., 2.

²¹² Jane’s, “Montenegro – Air Force,” *Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment-the Balkans*, IHS Markit, accessed March 27, 2017, <https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/1766974>, 1.

²¹³ Ibid.

²¹⁴ Ibid.

²¹⁵ Jane’s, “Montenegro – Navy,” *Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment-the Balkans*, IHS Markit, accessed March 27, 2017, <https://janes.ihs.com/Balkans/Display/1767064>.

Montenegrin Navy “is tasked with coastal patrols and minor training cruises along the Adriatic coast from its principal base at Tivat. The MCG is in the earliest stages of transitioning to a smaller, non-combat force while retaining the capability to conduct essential coastal patrols and react to natural and environmental disasters.”²¹⁶ In the future, Montenegro intends to develop mine diver capabilities to protect seaports from terrorist threats and equip its navy with small patrol boats.²¹⁷

Training

Training and defense resources are another important factor, which have significant effects in developing defense capabilities in the A-5 countries. Training allows these countries to enhance their capabilities, increase readiness, and improve interoperability.

Albania

The Training and Doctrine Command is the responsible unit to ensure training and education in the AAF. The Training and Doctrine Command mission is, “to provide education, training, and qualification of Officers, NCO, soldiers, and sailors, and civilians of all levels within AAF, and ensure development of doctrinal concepts and strategic studies.”²¹⁸ The NATO integration process and lessons learned from wide participation in

²¹⁶ Ibid.

²¹⁷ Ibid.

²¹⁸ *Për Miratimin e Planit Afatgjatë Të Zhvillimit Të Forcave Të Armatosura 2016 – 2025* (Tirana Albania: Botim i Qendrës së Botimeve Zyrtare, 2016), 1, accessed January 12, 2017, <http://www.mod.gov.al/pdf/PAZHFA-2016-2025.pdf>.

multinational operations and joint training, drove the AAF to adapt training curriculum according to NATO doctrine in close assistance and cooperation with strategic partners, particularly the United States. During the integration process, which concluded in 2013, Albania made enormous reforms to adapt the doctrine and training in line with NATO. As Jane's states, "the new doctrine commenced in 2015 and took into consideration increasing threat of transnational terrorism, particularly affiliated with the Islamic State, and the influx of refugees from the Middle East."²¹⁹

The current structure provides a full spectrum of training and education, integrated with civilian education in country and abroad. The main Training and Doctrine Command training and education enablers are the Albanian Armed Forces Academy, the Non-commissioned Officers Academy, the Troop School and Individual Training Center, the Simulation Center, and the Research and Doctrine Center.²²⁰

The foreign language center provides learning capabilities for English, French, German, Turkish, Greece, and Italian, primary for the AAF personnel assigned to deploy, work, and study abroad. In addition, neighboring countries from the Western Balkans send military students to attend the English courses based on a bilateral agreement for military cooperation. The significant support for enhancing training in Albania was the establishment of the National Simulation Center. The U.S modernization team CUBIC established National Simulation Center in 2013, and assisted until 2016 when the Training and Doctrine Command took over once the AAF were trained and able to

²¹⁹ Jane's, "Albanian Armed Forces," 48.

²²⁰ Ibid.

sustain the joint simulation operation. The National Simulation Center has provided enhanced training for all the AAF with scenarios based on current threat assessments. The National Simulation Center has enabled the AAF to conduct combined training with different countries in the region and NATO. The Training and Doctrine Command offers training and education for all ranks in the AAF. The significant program conducted in English is the strategic studies program in the field of security. The strategic studies programme in the field of security is a regional course that aims to train senior officers who should demonstrate ability and leadership to take on a high level of responsibility in the armed forces chain of command and work in high level positions at security agencies.²²¹ The Advanced Studies Programme in the field of security aims to enable selected military personnel to act with competence in staffs and other international structures.²²²

To enhance and increase interoperability, the AAF has been participated and hosted joint training, particularly with the A-5 countries and regional partners. The exercise objectives were:

1. Enhance abilities among member nations of the US-Adriatic Charter (A5) and regional partners to deploy/employ disaster relief assets to a stricken region in a timely and efficient manner.
2. Foster a whole of region/comprehensive response by strengthening relationships among regional, national and local government officials and as well as GOs, NGOs and other organizations.

²²¹ Republic of Albania, Armed Forces, “Program Development of TRADOC,” accessed January 29, 2017, <http://www.aaf.mil.al/english/index.php/arsimimi-ne-fa/109-zhvillimi-programor>, 1.

²²² Ibid.

3. Refine and improve existing emergency response compacts and agreements among partner nations in order to identify and resolve obstacles/gaps that inhibit the collective capacity to quickly respond to shared threat and hazards.
4. Enhance civil emergency preparedness/response information sharing among regional partner and organizations during all phases of the emergency management cycle.
5. Exercise and improve the Albanian National Civil Emergency Plan.²²³

Recently, Albania is conducting joint training exercises with scenarios including land, air, and maritime capabilities. This training has occurred in Albania and abroad as preparation for Albanian Joint Forces to deploy in NATO-U.S. led missions. For the first time on April 25, 2017, “A crew of a Cougar ‘Air Force’ helicopter flew to Germany to take part in the ‘Saber Junction 17’ multinational training, led by the United States.”²²⁴

As the Minister of Defense of the Republic of Albania stated:

The Air Force’s participation in these trainings abroad comes after the increase of presence and the contribution of the Army and Marine Force in international missions. Participation in the “Saber Junction 17” serves directly to the accomplishment of the Albanian obligations towards alliance, to make available in the future, in full readiness, two Cougar helicopters for the participation on NATO operations.²²⁵

The pre-deployment training is important for units and personnel that deploy in a mission and are under operational control or tactical control of a partner country. This assists with integration and unifying their actions. This training closes the interoperability gap in terms of equipment, policy, and training. This training has been conducted with

²²³ Republic of Albania, Armed Forces, “Program Development of TRADOC,” 1.

²²⁴ Ministry of Defence, Republic of Albania, “The First International Training for Air Force,” accessed April 28, 2017, <http://www.mod.gov.al/eng/index.php/newsroom/595-the-first-international-training-for-air-force>, 1.

²²⁵ Ibid.

the United States, the United Kingdom, Italy, Spain, Germany, and with A-5 countries in Croatia. Furthermore, Albania has expressed a desired to host Foreign Fighters NATO Center of Excellence. During the NATO Assembly on May 29, 2016, Defense Minister of Albania Mimi Kodheli, announced, “Our country has launched the initiative to establish the excellence center against foreign fighters.”²²⁶ The Center of Excellence for training against foreign fighters is to open in 2017. This initiative happened at the very important stage where the phenomenon is increasing and there is not any such specialized capability in NATO. According to the director of the Defense Intelligence and Security Agency, “Albania pitched the initiative after spotting a vacuum in NATO over this phenomenon.”²²⁷ In addition, Colonel Bardhyl Kollcaku said, “the phenomenon had existed for decades before growing in scale in recent years. We have the right experience to contribute to knowing, studying, addressing and further combating the phenomenon of foreign fighters. Albania’s geographical position as part of the Western Balkans has made it an origin for foreign fighters and we aim to share our lessons and experience.”²²⁸

²²⁶ Sonila Mehmeti, “NATO Assembly, Kodheli: Excellence Centre Against Foreign Fighters,” *Albanian Telegraphic Agency*, posted May 29, 2016, accessed February 24, 2017, <https://www.ata.gov.al/en/nato-assembly-kodheli-excellence-centre-against-foreign-fighters/>, 1.

²²⁷ Fatjona Mejdini, “Albania to Host NATO Centre on Foreign Fighters,” *Balkan Insight*, June 23, 2016, accessed February 24, 2017, <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/albania-will-host-nato-center-on-foreign-terrorist-fighters-06-23-2016>, 1.

²²⁸ Ibid.

Bosnia and Herzegovina

In 2007, Bosnia and Herzegovina established the Training and Doctrine Command. Based on the AFBiH brochure, “Education and training of MoD and AFBiH personnel is conducted in accordance with training doctrine, Training Guidelines, adopted training plans, programs of bilateral cooperation or agreed cooperation with representatives of partner countries and the international community.”²²⁹ The Training and Doctrine Command provides guidance for individual training, collective training, and joint collective training.²³⁰ Given the fact that the AFBiH consists of three ethnic groups, the joint collective training is an important event in terms of readiness for social reasons. The Training and Doctrine Command of Bosnia and Herzegovina includes the Peace Support Operation Training Center located in Butmir, Sarajevo.²³¹ This multinational institution is “an educational institution established with a specific purpose of delivering professional and internationally recognized education and staff training to members of the AFBiH and other armed forces in order to prepare them for participation in multinational peace support operations (PSO).”²³² In addition, the Peace Support Operation Training Center has enabled training for other officers, non-commissioned officers, and civilians from partner and regional countries, and makes this institution a

²²⁹ Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, *Brochure of the Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina*, 28.

²³⁰ Minister of Defence, Republic of Macedonia, “White Paper on Defence,” 33.

²³¹ Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, *Brochure of the Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina*.

²³² *Ibid.*, 28.

potential education resource for common interests in the region. Furthermore, the Peace Support Operation Training Center provides “mobile training teams trained 1,473

students o

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members of armed forces from the region.”²³³ Another potential training capability is the humanitarian demining courses based on the Bosnia and Herzegovina standard. ²³⁴

According the AFBiH brochure, the Training and Doctrine Command conducts the following countermine courses: “Basic Demining Course, House Clearance Course, Team/Squad Leader Course, course for operators of mechanical ground preparation machines, and scouts course. In addition to these, the EOD operator course, basic EOD team leader course, quality assurance inspector course, and the demining platoon (site) commander course also exist.”²³⁵ Bosnia and Herzegovina aims to be part of NATO and signed the MAP in 2010. Prior to that, Bosnia and Herzegovina agreed to develop 34 Force Goals (capabilities) in order to meet the obligations for NATO requirements. NATO provided significant support to train Bosnia and Herzegovina military personnel in NATO countries to assist Bosnia and Herzegovina to fulfill its obligation in terms of training and education.

Croatia

The Training and Doctrine Command, which offers training for all military personnel, provide Training and education in Croatia. The education system of the CAF

²³³ Ibid., 33.

²³⁴ Ibid., 35.

²³⁵ Ibid.

is in line with military and civilian requirements.²³⁶ The military students, used to sign scholarship contracts with the Ministry of Defense, which allowed them to attend civilian universities. This education was combined with periodic training in different military units.²³⁷ In 2014, Franj Tudjman, the military academy, established a new program, which offers civilian and military education and provides dual degrees for two branches, “military engineering,” and “military leadership management.”²³⁸ In the SDR and the *Long-Term Development Plan*, the army has defined developing training and infrastructure similar to potential NATO countries as a priority.²³⁹ The military education program for military personnel consists of:

- Basic military training 38 percent;
- Specialized training 41 percent;
- General military training 12 percent
- General physical training 9 percent.²⁴⁰

The main army and air training area (range), “Eugen Kvaternik,” is in Slunj Zadar.²⁴¹

This facility has served for conducting pre-deployment training of combined teams that deploy to mission abroad.²⁴²

²³⁶ Jane’s, “Croatian Armed Forces,” 87.

²³⁷ Ibid.

²³⁸ Ibid., 88.

²³⁹ Ibid.

²⁴⁰ Ibid.

²⁴¹ Ibid.

²⁴² Ibid.

Based on Jane's information, the Croatian Air Force and Air Defense, "participate in small in small scale single service and national-level exercise."²⁴³ In contrast to the army and air force, Croatia took over all the navy training schools of the former Yugoslavia.²⁴⁴ As Jane's states:

Training continues under a curriculum now being modified to meet NATO standards. New recruits and specialists are trained at the Naval Training Centre in Split (an integral part of the Croatian Military Academy [CMA] in Zagreb). A specialized naval graduate course at the CMA, in line with the civilian higher education system of Croatia, has started in October 2016." Beside the contribution in NATO mission, Croatia has significant contribution in the UN mission. Additionally, CAF has established "International Operation training Center," for preparing personnel who participate in the UN mission. Although, this center does not provide UN certificate, the training is in line with UN standards.²⁴⁵

Macedonia

The "White Paper on Defence" of the Republic of Macedonia defines military education and training as one of the greatest defense resources for developing military capabilities.²⁴⁶ The military academy, accredited by Bologna University and the European credit transfer system, offers all levels of academic education and degrees:

1. First cycle (BA) accredited programmed;
2. Second cycle accredited programmed (MSc and MA);

²⁴³ Jane's "Croatia," 102.

²⁴⁴ Jane's "Croatian Armed Forces," 116.

²⁴⁵ Gordan Bosanac, "Peacekeeping Contributor Profile: Croatia," Providing for Peacekeeping, last updated August 2014, accessed November 24, 2016, <http://www.providingforpeacekeeping.org/2014/08/13/peacekeeping-contributor-profile-croatia/>, 1.

²⁴⁶ Minister of Defence, Republic of Macedonia, "White Paper on Defence," 51.

3. The third cycle (PhD) accreditation is ongoing.²⁴⁷

In addition, the military academy has established advanced professional education for logistic specialties, company commanders, and battalion level.²⁴⁸ Furthermore, based on a bilateral agreement, Montenegro sent its military personnel to attend training in Macedonia. One of the most comprehensive approaches, education and training is addressing the new challenges in the security environment. Another important training capability of ARM, is the Medical Training Centre, established in partnership with the Swiss confederation.²⁴⁹ This center can provide significant support for the A-5 countries to develop Role 2 Medical Light Maneuver capabilities as a NATO requirement, support the development of the Balkan Medical Task Force (BMTF), and enhance medical cooperation in the Western Balkans. The decision of the ARM to turn this medical training facility into a regional center will benefit the entire region. However, this trend requires more investment in this capability. In addition, the Regional Training Communication Centre provides the capability to conduct public affairs training. In 2011, Macedonia launched the initiative for transforming this center into PfP/NATO Center of Excellence.²⁵⁰ This center will provide three levels of training for interagency and regional public affairs and CIMIC participants.²⁵¹ The training efforts in public affairs,

²⁴⁷ Ibid.

²⁴⁸ Ibid., 54.

²⁴⁹ Ibid.

²⁵⁰ Ibid.

²⁵¹ Ibid., 33.

media, and public communications is important for Macedonia and the entire region in order to fulfill the capabilities for reconstruction and stability operations as part of unified land operation. Despite the fact that Macedonia has developed specialized training facilities, collective training for enhancing interoperability remains vital for future development of combat forces and participation in multinational operations.

Montenegro

The Montenegro established its armed forces in 2006 after gaining independence from the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro. According to the SDR, improvement of the staff education system is “One of the priorities of the future system of military education of officers is its capacity to develop a professional military education for officers within the current higher education system of Montenegro.”²⁵² The idea is to develop an educational system that which will serve military personnel for the future. For this reason, the Ministry of Defense of Montenegro has employed a bilateral agreement with the University of Montenegro.²⁵³ As another means of training, Montenegro is utilizing its regional partners and NATO to fulfill the armed forces requirement. The NATO membership process helped Montenegro to drive military transformation and training to “encompass the training of cadets at military academies in partner countries, provide a sufficient number of young military personnel and adequate recruitment for branches and services of the Armed Forces of Montenegro.” Based on the SDR, “in order to improve leadership skills, Montenegro will not develop a special military education

²⁵² Ministry of Defence, Montenegro, *Strategic Defence Review of Montenegro*.

²⁵³ Ibid., 33.

system, rather, it will use the resources available in NATO and partner countries.”²⁵⁴ The main priority for training remains certification of units declared as pool of forces. For instance, in October 2015, “The 2nd Light Infantry Company, which is declared by the Montenegro Armed Forces for the NATO Pool of Forces, achieved SEL-1 level. In the next four years the unit is to obtain NEL-2 level and become fully interoperable with NATO units.”²⁵⁵ Additionally, the United States has supported Montenegro to take part in “the Combined Resolve V exercise held at the Grafenwöhr Training Area, Eastern Germany. It sought to improve interoperability, flexibility, and agility levels between NATO and PfP forces in an integrated environment.”²⁵⁶ Overall, based on Jane’s analysis, “the land forces of Montenegro are able to conduct minor small-scale operations,” and maintain an effective military, but need to employ a system that sustains long-term development of the armed forces with the necessary infrastructure and equipment.²⁵⁷

Adriatic Charter Cooperation: A Regional Approach for Common Response

Regional cooperation is becoming very popular nowadays, where countries from different regions cooperate to pursue their national political, economic, social, and security interests. Good examples of regional cooperation are the Baltic Cooperation, the

²⁵⁴ Ministry of Defence, Montenegro, *Strategic Defence Review of Montenegro* 33.

²⁵⁵ Jane’s, “Montenegro,” 28.

²⁵⁶ Ibid.

²⁵⁷ Ibid.

Nordic Cooperation, and the Visegrad Group.²⁵⁸ Before explaining the history of regional cooperation in the Western Balkans, addressing the reasons that led the Western Balkan countries to collaborate is crucial.

First, the A-5 countries share the same geographic area and security environment. According to the nations' strategic documents, NSS, NMS, SDR, and white policy papers the Western Balkans share common threats such as terrorism, return foreign fighters, natural disasters, the flow of refugees the from Middle East to western Europe, and organized crime. These threats require collaboration, exchange of information, enhanced capabilities, shared understanding, and a common response.

Second, the A-5 countries in the Western Balkan countries share the same strategic goals and ambitions of membership to Euro-Atlantic organizations (NATO and EU). This goal has shaped the countries' development profiles in terms of security, economic, social, and rule of law. Croatia is the only one who fulfilled the strategic goal by entering NATO in 2009 and becoming an EU member in 2013. Albania entered NATO in 2009, and based on the latest development, Montenegro will become a NATO member in 2017. Macedonia's membership is pending due to a dispute with Greece for the constitutional name of Macedonia. Bosnia and Herzegovina signed the MAP in 2010 and is working towards membership amidst challenges of political disputes regarding the membership.²⁵⁹ In addition to the will to join, the countries accepted the obligation of

²⁵⁸ Wikipedia, "Nordic-Baltic Eight," Wikipedia Foundation, accessed April 20, 2017, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nordic-Baltic_Eight.

²⁵⁹ Wikipedia, "Enlargement of NATO: Bosnia and Herzegovina," Wikipedia Foundation, accessed April 20, 2017, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Enlargement_of_NATO#Bosnia_and_Herzegovina.

developing capability targets and forces goals. These capabilities are generic in nature and are the same for all members of the alliance. The countries cannot fulfill these capabilities alone, which led to regional cooperation to increase the military capabilities. Furthermore, NATO provides guidance on how small countries can provide significant contributions to a collective defense. As Secretary Rasmussen noted, “Pooling and sharing are vital if we want to develop our military know-how and capabilities. And NATO is best placed to identify and connect nations that have similar needs but not enough money to build a capability on their own.”²⁶⁰

Finally, the framework theory of “constructivist” school of thought facilitates regional cooperation as the adequate tool for socializing regional actors towards peace and prosperity.²⁶¹ According to Levkovska and Franklin, “Constructivist assumptions reinforce our argument of sustained interest for contribution towards peace and stability that countries in the region develop throughout their different ways of interaction with the international community and more specifically with the alliance.”²⁶² Therefore, it is time for the Western Balkans to continue in the new era to fulfill their strategic goals and enhance peace and prosperity in the region.

²⁶⁰ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Building Security in an Age of Austerity.”

²⁶¹ Wendt, 1. Basic tenets of Constructivism: “that the structures of human association are determined primarily by shared ideas rather than material forces, and that the identities and interests of purposive actors are constructed by these shared ideas rather than given by nature.”

²⁶² Levkovska and Franklin, 8.

The History of Regional Cooperation

After successful involvement during the conflict in the Western Balkans, the international community, NATO, and the United States considered establishing a mechanism to preserve regional security and lead the Western Balkan countries towards peace and stability. The change in the security environment and nations' interests led to a change in strategic direction towards regional cooperation. In June 2001, President George W. Bush, stated:

Every European nation that struggles towards democracy and free markets and strong civic culture must be welcomed into Europe's home. All of Europe's new democracies from Baltic to the Black Sea, and that entire lie in between, should have the same chance for security and freedom and the same chance to join the institutions of Europe as Europe's old democracies have.²⁶³

The terrorist attacks in the United States in 2001 served as a test for the NATO alliance on their contribution on the subject of collective defense, and led to a need for the transformation process.²⁶⁴ The Prague Summit will bring a new vision:

- New capabilities to overcome threats, most of all in bridging the gap between military capabilities of the U.S and other members;
- New relationships between NATO, Russia, Ukraine, and the Partnership for peace;
- New members that need to contribute to NATO's new goals, secure its role as the key security institution in the Euro-Atlantic region.²⁶⁵

The Prague Summit declaration endorsed the NATO open door policy and recognized three Western Balkan countries (Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia) as

²⁶³ Grdešić, 105.

²⁶⁴ Ibid., 110.

²⁶⁵ Ibid.

potential candidates by entering a new epoch in close cooperation with NATO and the United States called the Adriatic Charter Partnership.²⁶⁶ The United States used the Baltic Cooperation Partnership as a successful model for drafting the Adriatic Charter Partnership, for “similar development and common past” of these two regions.²⁶⁷ The U.S.-Adriatic Charter²⁶⁸ goal was:

Readiness for a full integration in European and transatlantic political, economic, security and defense institutions. The partners are willing to shoulder their part of the responsibility in achieving the goal of a whole and free Europe. This Europe will be established only when all the countries become members. The US welcomes and supports the aspirations of Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia for their membership in NATO at the first opportunity. The US feels that these democracies must get their chance for full membership. Aspirants need to be invited into the alliance as soon as they meet the criteria for membership.²⁶⁹

This Charter Partnership endorses the commitment of partner countries to leverage “bilateral, regional and multinational relationships”²⁷⁰ among themselves, as well as neighbor countries. In 2008, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Montenegro joined the partnership (A-5). Under this partnership, Albania, Macedonia and Croatia, made significant progress in development of democracy, economy, and improvement of security.²⁷¹

²⁶⁶ Grdešić, 112.

²⁶⁷ Ibid., 115.

²⁶⁸ The charter was signed in Tirana, on May 2, 2003, by U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powel, Foreign Minister of Albania Ilir Meta, Foreign Minister of Macedonia Ilinka Mitreva, and Foreign Minister of Croatia Tonino Picula.

²⁶⁹ Grdešić, 116.

²⁷⁰ Ibid.

²⁷¹ Wikipedia, “U.S.-Adriatic Charter.”

From the beginning, the Adriatic Charter Partnership laid out the implementation, which consisted many training activities among the Western Balkan and PfP countries. One important aspect of cooperation was preparing and participating in multinational operations. First, the A-3 countries contributed with medical specialist teams in operations in the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. From 2005-2009, Albania, Macedonia, and Croatia deployed two rotation medical combined teams each year.²⁷² Additionally, “besides former involvement stemming from A-3 format, A-5 member countries have tried to maintain a high level of cooperation. Thus, under the proposal of the Croatian party, there is in process the involvement of ‘The Adriatic Charter’ (A-5) countries with training and monitoring teams in Afghanistan.”²⁷³ Prior to deployment, the combined teams conducted integration training in Croatia. Because the A-5 countries deployed small contingents, Croatia, the lead nation, provided support for the other A-5 countries. It is very difficult for small countries with small contingents to deploy national support elements to support their troops in areas of operation at strategic distances like Afghanistan. Another important aspect of regional cooperation through the Adriatic Charter Partnership is training in different areas such as crisis response operations, disaster relief, and logistic exercises.

²⁷² Minister of Defence, Republic of Macedonia, “White Paper on Defence.”

²⁷³ Ministry of Defence, Republic of Albania, “U.S - Adriatic Charter (A-5).”

Lines of Efforts of the Adriatic Charter Cooperation

The military capabilities of the A-5 countries were analyzed using the organization and training factors of DOTMLPF. There are some capability gaps and potential capabilities that A-5 countries can share in multinational operations.

Line of Effort 1: Strategic Lift

Strategic lift and sustainment in multinational operations is one of the requirements for participation in multinational operations and exercises. It is the responsibility of the country contributing the troops to ensure strategic movement at long distances, called strategic lift.²⁷⁴ Based on the requirements for deployment or redeployment, each NATO country must be able to provide:

1. Capable of air transportation of light payloads over long distances;
2. Capable of airlifting average working cargo payloads (material, equipment, or vehicles) of 50 tons or transporting 100 fully equipped combat soldiers.
3. Capable of a minimum of 30 days self-sustained operations (regarding required supplies besides fuel).
4. Capable of conducting sealift of 2,000 Lane-Meters of wheeled and tracked vehicles over long distances.²⁷⁵

Meeting these requirements is difficult for small countries with restricted budgets and other nations as well. Based on the current assessment of the organizations, the A-5 countries do not have any fix wing assets for strategic movement. Croatia is the only country in the A-5 that has mitigated this objective with membership in the Movement

²⁷⁴ Supreme Allied Command, Europe and Supreme Allied Command, Transportation, Memorandum, Subject: BI-SC Capability Codes and Capability Statements, 20-25.

²⁷⁵ Ibid.

Coordination Center Europe, which provides coordination for strategic lift. Recently, Albania has deployed the NATO Response Force component with commercial means in its expenses to participate in multinational NATO exercises in Italy and Poland by using air, sea, and land modes of transportation. Other countries have ensured strategic lift based on a bilateral agreement with strategic partners. However, this solution is a short-term solution. Thinking in the long term, it would be more appropriate for the Western Balkan countries, particularly the A-5 countries, to consolidate their requirements for strategic lift into one requirement and proceed with NATO agencies that provide strategic capabilities, since they have common interests towards NATO and EU. This solution will be more cost effective and reach the target for ensuring strategic lift. Given that the A-5 countries are contributing combined teams in joint operation areas, a common response and sharing capabilities and costs for strategic movement would be the most suitable option. This initiative was considered during the annual meeting the heads of logistics of the A-5 countries, but no action has been taken yet. Analysis on this requirement requires a working group and detailed planning considering NATO guidance.

Line of Effort 2: Air Surveillance and Air Defense

Based on the assessment by Jane's, NATO, and the strategic documents of all A-5 countries, air defense and air surveillance is considered a shortfall, which requires a regional solution.²⁷⁶ Prior to 1990, the entire Western Balkans region had a massive air defense asset mainly imported from the eastern bloc, including China. However, by now they have become obsolete. Maintaining these capabilities was useless and it was

²⁷⁶ Demi and Hudhra, 1.

expensive to ensure readiness and sustainment. The defense transformation process with NATO led the Western Balkan countries to develop capabilities that are in line with NATO requirements and interoperable with allies. It is vital for the A-5 countries to ensure air defense up to a certain level and integrated with air surveillance. For the first time in 2011, the chiefs of defense of the A5 Western Balkan nations endorsed the following:

1. There is a need for an improved air surveillance capability in the Balkans and a common approach is recommended;
2. The plan to deploy 4 radars to meet BVC requirements in the Region appears sound (Albania (Fushe), Republic of Macedonia (Turtel), Montenegro (Vrsuta), Bosnia and Herzegovina (Jahorina)). Other radars may contribute to enhanced volumetric coverage and offer redundancy, and would be welcomed;
3. The use of NATO agencies for procurement, implementation and in-service support is recommended and requires further analysis;
4. Participation in the Air Surveillance Data Exchange (ASDE) programme, including preparation of the required MoUs and Technical Arrangements is endorsed.²⁷⁷

NATO and its agencies began analyzing the requirement for developing the project.

According to Jane's: "A memorandum of understanding concluded with NATO in 2011, specifies the connectivity of national air surveillance and reporting capabilities with NATO integrated Air Defense System. Modern three dimensional radar systems are planned as part of Balkan Regional Approach to Air Defense (BRAAD)."²⁷⁸

²⁷⁷ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *Balkan Regional Approach to Air Defence (BRAAD): Role of NATO* (Brussels, Belgium: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2013), accessed March 6, 2017, https://bihnato.files.wordpress.com/2013/02/nato-role-in-braad_20111128.pdf, 1.

²⁷⁸ Jane's "Macedonian Armed Forces," 2.

The BRAAD²⁷⁹ goal was to build air defense integrated with NATO infrastructure with optimized cost through a regional approach. Building air defense and air surveillance in the Western Balkans is important to close the security gap in the Adriatic Sea.

Line of Effort 3: Explosive Ordinance Disposal Capabilities

Lessons learned from multinational operations show that developing the EOD capabilities is becoming crucial due to the increased threat in the hostile environment from the use of Improvised Explosive Devices and other weapons. Based on the assessment of organizations in the A-5 partnership, the EOD capabilities have increased and this has served as a priority for modernization efforts. Through security cooperation, the United States has provided enormous effort in the Western Balkan countries. For instance, the Officer Defense Cooperation Albania has assisted through Foreign Military Sales, equipping the EOD Company with very modern equipment such as robots, EOD protection kits, and detection devices.²⁸⁰ This project has been also been key priority for the Albanian Ministry of Defense as a national capability and fulfilling the NATO requirement in terms of capability targets. As the matter of fact, the Albania EOD

²⁷⁹ The Balkan Regional Approach to Air Defence (BRAAD) is a NATO multinational initiative conceived by the NATO's International Staff (DI/AERO/SAD section) and supported by NC3A, NAMS, NACMA and NCSA/NPC. The aim of BRAAD is to coordinate and facilitate a cooperative regional approach for the modernization of air defense capabilities of the Balkan nations, fostering a greater interoperability among these nations and with NATO, and allowing significant cost reductions to the nations.

²⁸⁰ Office of Strategic Initiatives, Headquarters, U.S. European Command, *A Primer on Theater Security Cooperation Resources in the U.S. European Command* (Stuttgart, Germany: Headquarters, U.S. European Command, February 20, 2015), 142.

Company participated in the EU mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the third rotation is now deployed in the EU mission in Mali, Africa.²⁸¹

According to the U.S.-Adriatic Charter niche capabilities for joint contribution in the mission and operations within NATO, UN, and EU, Bosnia and Herzegovina has declared one EOD platoon for participation in quick response on terrorist attacks (Improvised Explosive Devices), clearance of military ranges, and disposing of obsolete munitions. This capability goes along with fulfillment of partnership goals for NATO membership. This platoon is equipped with enhanced capabilities such as robot Pack boot, Talon, metal detectors, Improvised Explosive Device sets, electronic stethoscope, and other tools that allow the Bosnia and Herzegovina EOD platoon to conduct EOD multinational operations.²⁸²

The third country that declared EOD capabilities is Montenegro. Based on the report, Montenegro is able to contribute, particularly in humanitarian demining, with an EOD team consisting of 12 personnel.²⁸³

The United States, through the Office of Defence Cooperation in the Western Balkans, has provided outstanding support in developing defense capabilities and supporting NATO membership, especially with U.S equipment and adequate training.

²⁸¹ Ministry of Defence, Republic of Albania, “International Missions,” accessed March 10, 2017, <http://www.mod.gov.al/index.php/politikat-e-sigurise/misione-nderkombetare/misione-aktuale>.

²⁸² Ministry of Defence, Republic of Albania, “Permbledhje e shkurter e historikut te bashkepunimit ne kuadrin e A-5,” Minutes of A-5 (Tirana, Albania: Ministry of Defence, Republic of Albania).

²⁸³ Ibid.

These events need to be followed with regional training in order to ensure interoperability and increase capacity. Additionally, according to the “White Paper on Defence,” Macedonia intends to develop one engineering platoon and one engineering demining team in order to participate in NATO multinational operations.²⁸⁴

According to the minutes of the Chiefs of Defence conference of the A-5 countries, “Cooperative effort in achieving NATO partnership goals and capability targets,” all the members agreed to develop the catalog of niche capabilities that A-5 countries are developing in cooperation with each other.²⁸⁵ This decision allows these countries to enhance the EOD capabilities and take responsibility for active engagement in a collective defense with very special and critical capabilities, which NATO demands is a priority.

Line of Effort 4: Disaster Relief Response Capabilities

During the assessment of risks and threats in the Western Balkans, all strategic documents of A-5 consider “emergence and natural disaster”²⁸⁶ as a potential threat. In addition, lessons learned from the history of natural disasters has shown that the Western Balkans do not have enough capabilities to respond to disaster relief. For instance, flooding caused collateral damage in Albania and Bosnia-Herzegovina infrastructure, agriculture, and urban areas. In such circumstances, the need for a regional response is in

²⁸⁴ Minister of Defence, Republic of Macedonia, “White Paper on Defence,” 40.

²⁸⁵ Ministry of Defence, Republic of Albania, “Permbledhje e shkurter e historikut te bashkepunimit ne kuadrin e A-5.”

²⁸⁶ Peci, 16.

high demand and no country has enough capabilities to respond alone. The A-5 countries and authorities are considering building a regional approach response, and the cooperation has begun with regional training and working groups to address the capabilities and legal aspects of different scenarios in the region.²⁸⁷

To deal with disaster relief operations, Albania has a battalion that provides SAR capabilities. Units used to have close cooperation with the New Jersey National Guard, Italy, and Swiss SAR units. The Search and Rescue Company mainly provides firefighter capabilities, earthquake capabilities, and flooding and route cleansing capabilities. The Air Force and Navy also provide SAR capability and operations. At the national level, the Search and Rescue Center is at the Joint Operation Center as part of the General Staff. The Search and Rescue Center is responsible for coordinating and monitoring the SAR operations within and outside of Albania.

Another A-5 country that possesses SAR capabilities is Bosnia and Herzegovina. Based on the draft catalogue, Bosnia and Herzegovina will provide SAR capabilities, medical evacuation, casualty evacuation, and firefighting operation teams.²⁸⁸ As assessed before, Bosnia and Herzegovina is one of the countries that are often affected by the threat of natural disasters.

²⁸⁷ Ministry of Defence, Republic of Albania, “Permbledhje e shkurter e historikut te bashkepunimit ne kuadrin e A-5,” 2.

²⁸⁸ Ministry of Defence, Republic of Albania, *U.S.-Adriatic Charter, Draft Catalogue of A-5 Military Disaster Relief Response Capabilities* (Tirana, Albania: Ministry of Defence, Republic of Albania), 2.

Croatia will also provide firefighter capabilities, particularly for forest operations, and other SAR teams with response in 24 hours.²⁸⁹ This diversity of capabilities allows this region to be able to conduct emergency response with a variety of scenarios. Macedonia is another contributor to join the response, and “has declared that will contribute with own disaster relief response capabilities, as part of A-5, in regional disaster relief assistance in accordance with the type scenario and appropriate resources.”²⁹⁰ Finally, Montenegro has declared significant capabilities, which covers medical, command and control capabilities, firefighting, humanitarian demining, engineering, air rotary assets, and CBRN capabilities.²⁹¹ One of the most specialized capabilities that Montenegro provides is a decontamination system, which plays a crucial role in dealing with such scenarios.

An important aspect of disaster relief operations is coordination among the A-5 countries. In order to exchange information regarding the capabilities, countries must develop and publish a host nation capability catalog at joint operation centers. This catalog should contain all the specific data and details of all nations’ assets such as ports, airports, rail systems, bridge load capacities, legal aspects, and point of contacts. The training events sponsored by the United States has played a great role in establishing initial capabilities and promoting interoperability and socializing of the A-5 SAR teams.

²⁸⁹ Ibid., 3.

²⁹⁰ Ministry of Defence, Republic of Albania, *U.S.-Adriatic Charter, Draft Catalogue of A-5 Military Disaster Relief Response Capabilities*, 3.

²⁹¹ Ibid., 4-5.

Line of Effort 5: Joint Training and Exercise

Training remains the most vital factor for testing capabilities, increasing readiness, enhancing capabilities, standardization, socializing, and team building. The history of transformation of the military forces shows that building the military forces is much easier than maintaining it. This is connected with the budget, training, and education particularly when new capabilities are employed that might have doctrinal implications. During the assessment of training and education, the author recognized that the A-5 countries have different training capabilities and infrastructures. Some of them are only for national purposes, while others are also for international and regional purposes. For instance, the Baltics are using polling and sharing concepts for training facilities.²⁹² In many aspects, the Adriatic countries are like the Baltics in terms of size, threats, geography, budgets, and other aspects. NATO and the EU enforce regional cooperation as an instrument for the integration process. The cooperation helps these countries to implement NATO doctrine, develop capabilities under restricted budgets, and apply common sharing.

In recent years, Albania has conducted a Senior Regional on Defense and Security Course.²⁹³ The course curriculum provides studies for senior military leadership and civilian equivalents with participants from the region and NATO countries. In this course, Albania invited lecturers from the George Marshall Center and other credible strategic study institutes. Another source for regional training is the establishment in Albania of

²⁹² Gotkowska and Osica, 5.

²⁹³ Demi and Hudhra, 5.

the Centre of Excellence for training for fighting foreign fighters. The Center of Excellence will provide training for NATO and partners by assisting in doctrine and lesson learned from experiences in multinational operations.²⁹⁴ In addition, they support allied command transformation by closing the training gap that exists in the alliance in the training for combating terrorism.²⁹⁵

Bosnia and Herzegovina has great training and education capabilities in the Peace Support Operation Training Centre. Many countries from the region and other partners send their personnel to this center. The Peace Support Operation Training Center provides a variety of courses, but the most important for the region are the captain career course and peace support operation training courses. Additionally, Bosnia and Herzegovina has great training capabilities in EOD operations.²⁹⁶

Croatia has the most potential of the A-5 countries regarding military capabilities, and has been providing pre-deployment training for A-5 combined teams deploying to Afghanistan.²⁹⁷ Croatia plays a lead nation role in this operation, and based on bilateral agreements with Albania, Bosnia- Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Montenegro has provided real life support and sustainment as well. Another important capability in Croatia is the International Operation Training Center, which provides training in

²⁹⁴ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Centres of Excellence,” last updated August 26, 2016, accessed March 6, 2017, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_68372.htm/#, 1.

²⁹⁵ Ibid.

²⁹⁶ Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, *Brochure of the Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina*.

²⁹⁷ Ministry of Defence, Republic of Albania, “U.S - Adriatic Charter (A-5).”

accordance with NATO and UN standards and requirements.²⁹⁸ Furthermore, Croatia, Montenegro, and Albania have maritime capabilities; therefore, an exchange of the training and education among them will be cost beneficial.

Macedonia is another country that has potential training facilities, which will be very beneficial to all A-5 countries in developing NATO capability targets particularly for medical, public information, and CIMIC.²⁹⁹ The Medical Training Center and Regional Training Communication Centre are potential capabilities for international training.³⁰⁰ These facilities will enable the Western Balkans to enhance their joint enabling capability target, such as Role 2 Light Maneuver and CIMIC teams, as a national and NATO target for contribution in a collective defense.

Line of Effort 6: Medical Capabilities

Besides the A-5, some other initiatives in the Western Balkans bring the same efforts, enhance cooperation, and meet national objectives. In 2010, the United States launched the idea of enhancing the Balkan Regional Military Cooperation and they decided to establish a working group with Norway, Serbia, and Macedonia to assess the military capabilities and develop a concept for a BMTF.³⁰¹ In 2011, Serbia, Albania,

²⁹⁸ Bosanac, 1.

²⁹⁹ Minister of Defence, Republic of Macedonia, “White Paper on Defence,” 54.

³⁰⁰ Ibid.

³⁰¹ Balkan Medical Task Force, “Balkan Medical Task Force History,” accessed January 7, 2017, <http://balkanmedicaltaskforce.com/page/history>.

Macedonia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Montenegro agreed to start a working group.³⁰² According to the term of references, the BMTF purpose is:

To provide medical support at Role 2 level on Crises Response Operations (CRO) on a sustainable level and to give rapid response to a broad spectrum of regional disaster relief situation. The goal is to enable the participating nations to provide vital capabilities to international operations and enhance national medical services capacities and to achieve national NATO and Partnership for Peace (PfP) force goals (capability targets).³⁰³

To sum up, regional cooperation is a great approach for the A-5 and Western Balkans because it allows all countries to contribute with special capabilities and work in common areas. This partnership is open for all Western Balkan countries, including Kosovo and Serbia, which both have observer status in the partnership. Kosovo is willing to join the A-5 Partnership as a full member. All these lines of effort bring greater capabilities to the partnership, increase capacity, enhance training and readiness, and most importantly socialize the Western Balkans to work together towards peace and prosperity. The diversity of the efforts is in line with the NATO obligation to develop capability targets and force goals, which leads to the modernization, transformation, and integration to NATO for the candidate members. The framework cooperation in multinational operations is very important in terms of cost benefit, representation, and sustainment of operational reach. By referring to Line of Effort 5: Joint Training and Exercise, one can conclude that this effort represents a complementary development and will lead to cooperation for common response. Figure three, shows the operation approach and lines of efforts in the A-5 regional cooperation.

³⁰² Ibid.

³⁰³ Ibid.




Figure 3. Operational Approach of Adriatic Charter Regional Cooperation

Source: Created by author using information from Dale C. Eikmeier, *From Operational Art to Operations Plans, a Joint Planning Primer* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Department of Joint and Multinational Operations, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, June 27, 2012), 27.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Introduction

The objective of the study was to identify the military capability gap that exists in the Adriatic Charter cooperation in the Western Balkans, and build the operational approach to close these gaps to achieve the strategic goal of the Western Balkans, which is full membership in Euro-Atlantic organizations. The findings in the study suggest that the strategic goal, integration in the Euro-Atlantic organizations had a significant impact on the development of the A-5 countries. Countries have to undertake major military transformation reforms, and political, economic, social, and the rule of law reforms. Thus far, the development of these objectives as national and NATO obligations has been hindered for political, economic, and social reasons.³⁰⁴ Additionally, the study suggests that the decline of U.S involvement in the Western Balkans has raised many security concerns and caused a delay in the integration process in the Western Balkans.³⁰⁵

This chapter will conclude findings in the three main areas. First, the author will address the current security environment in the Western Balkans and the desired end state of the A-5 countries in the Western Balkan, as the national objectives and strategic goal. Second, based on DOTMLPF analysis, particularly organization and training, the author has addressed the military capability gaps and potential capabilities among the A-5

³⁰⁴ Jane's, *Security Assessment, the Balkans*, IHS Markit, accessed March 26, 2017, <https://jan.es.ihs.com/Janes/Display/1301767>.

³⁰⁵ Bugajski, 1.

partnership. Third, based on the findings of the environment and shortfalls, the author suggests the operational approach and lines of efforts to close the gap between the current environment and the desired end state, which is full integration of the A-5 countries in NATO and EU.

After the conflicts ended in the Western Balkans, the security environment changed and brought about a new stage. The international community, the United States, and NATO started thinking about to maintain safety and stability in the Western Balkans. The successful implementation of the Baltic Cooperation led the United States to implement the same approach for the Western Balkans. This concluded in 2003 with the establishment of the Adriatic Charter Partnership between Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia. Under the auspices of the United States, the aim of the partnership was, “Securing and NATO Open Door Policy, and promotion of good neighborhood.”³⁰⁶

The defense reform and transformation began with reviewing the strategic security documents such as NSS, NMS, white policy papers, and SDR. The assessment of these papers showed that the Western Balkans share the same perception of the threats and challenges. The most common obvious threats are nonmilitary, terrorism, corruption, weak governance, international organized crime, proliferation, weapons of mass destruction, natural disasters, spreading of extremism and radicalism, and cyber security.³⁰⁷

³⁰⁶ Grdešić, 104-106.

³⁰⁷ Peci, 9-11.

Second, all of the A-5 countries have the same strategic goal, integration in the Euro-Atlantic international organizations (NATO and EU). Currently, this goal has only been achieved by Croatia, which is a member of NATO (2009) and the EU (2013). Albania has been a NATO member since 2009, and Montenegro is finishing the ratification process, and should become a NATO member in 2017. Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina are working towards membership. In general, the political instability, countries' relationships and disputes, and ethnic and religious unrest has caused tension and delays in the integration process to NATO and the EU.

Another important finding, which has hindered the integration process, is a decline of U.S policy and involvement in the Western Balkans. Some scholars believe that after September 11, the U.S policy focus shifted to the Middle East and they left the EU to take the lead role in the Western Balkans. This policy has raised many concerns about unfinished U.S involvement in the Western Balkans, and has brought about increased Russian involvement in the Western Balkans.³⁰⁸ However, the NATO membership of Montenegro will close the geographic security gap in the Adriatic Sea, and end the long running Russian objective of building a military base in this area.³⁰⁹ Russia is using energy supply as an instrument of power to enforce their foreign policy, particularly with Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Macedonia. The project

³⁰⁸ Bugajski, 1.

³⁰⁹ The Economist, "NATO and Russia: In the Balkans, NATO has Outmuscled Russia," 2015, accessed November 23, 2016, <https://www.economist.com/news/europe/21683967-montenegros-accession-fills-one-few>.

of the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline, which will come to the Western Balkans through Turkey, Greece, and Albania will affect energy dependence in the Western Balkans.

The process of integration and transformation of the A-5 countries led these countries to accept the NATO force goals and capability targets. These goals and capabilities enable NATO and partner countries to contribute to a collective defense. Albania and Croatia have accepted the capability targets. Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Montenegro have developed force goals. These capabilities and force goals are very generic and the same for all countries. The current defense spending is lower than the minimum NATO benchmark of 2 percent, and it does not look like this goal will be met until 2020.³¹⁰ Current defense spending does not fulfill the requirement for developing the NATO capabilities. Although all of the A-5 countries have developed long-term development plans, defense resources will originate implementation, which in many cases is delayed and affected by the shifting priorities in other directions. For instance, Croatia and Macedonia also participate in the EU Battle Group. This initiative also requires the same capabilities, which sometimes overlap NATO capabilities.

The most critical shortfall in the A-5 countries is strategic lift. None of the countries has airlift assets, and there is no intent to develop them. Albania and Croatia are participating in NATO Response Forces, which requires strategic movement on short notice. Currently, Albania has sustained this deployment through commercial means, at its own expense, but this capability needs a long-term solution. Croatia has mitigated this

³¹⁰ See chapter 4. The defence budget of each A-5 country is lower than 2 percent.

capability with membership in the Movement Coordination Centre Europe.³¹¹ However, this agency does not ensure strategic lift on short notice, but it provides coordination with other lift agencies.³¹² Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Montenegro have ensured strategic lift with bilateral cooperation with potential NATO countries. Hence, the rise of a complex environment is accompanied by the growth of a demand for strategic movement.

Another capability gap was the lack of air surveillance and air defense assets. The transformation process in line with NATO asks for air surveillance and air defense that is able to exchange information with NATO allies. Although the Western Balkans inherited a large number of these capabilities, they became obsolete. Given the importance of air policing and defense, the NATO smart project in the Western Balkans, BRAAD, will close the air defense security gap.³¹³ Additionally, BRAAD will enable the A-5 countries to build integrated capabilities at an affordable cost.

In recent years, natural disasters have affected the Western Balkans. The response to civil emergencies is different in different countries. However, the military is always asked to respond. No country has the capability to respond alone. Developing SAR units and operational command and control is important for disaster relief operations. Although all A-5 countries have joint operation centers and commands, which provide coordination among services (air, land, and navy), they are also responsible for exchanging

³¹¹ Wikipedia, "Movement Coordination Centre Europe," 1.

³¹² Ibid.

³¹³ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *Balkan Regional Approach to Air Defence (BRAAD): Role of NATO*, 1.

information with other regional countries. One important capability, which requires development, is a catalog of the host nation capabilities. Moreover, this is a NATO requirement in order to conduct combined and joint operations and exchange information for freedom of movement of allied forces in these countries. Feeding this system with data is an adequate task, and it will help the countries to access and exchange information among with each other. This data includes the capacities of airports, seaports, rail systems, bridge load capacities, storage capacities, etc.

All A-5 countries have developed initial EOD capabilities. In developing this capability, the United States has provided significant effort in terms of equipment and training. Albanian EOD teams deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and are currently operating in Mali. Bosnia and Herzegovina has also developed great EOD capabilities. This EOD capability has different levels of training, from operators to the specialized train the trainers. Joining the EOD combined teams will increase the capacity and sustain training efforts. Enhancing EOD capabilities in the A-5 partnership will be a valuable asset for the Western Balkans and the alliance.

In addition, all NATO and partner countries have an obligation to develop a Medical Role 2 Light Maneuver. In assessment of capabilities of the A-5 countries, the Western Balkan countries individually cannot meet this requirement. Each country has complimentary capabilities. The BMTF is a great capability in the Western Balkans cooperation. In addition to the A-5 countries, Slovenia and Serbia are part of this task

force. Serbia is a framework nation and leads the BMTF.³¹⁴ This framework can be an example for developing other framework capabilities such as EOD, SAR, and CBRN.

Finally, the most important capability that enhances readiness and interoperability is joint training and exercises. The military education process in the A-5 countries has been in transformation, and all the countries are trying to adapt dual use education, military and civilian. This is a great effort to sustain the adaptability of military personnel to work in civilian life after they retire or go to the reserves. It also closes the gap for some specialized professions. It was also recognized that each country could not fulfill the requirement for all types of training, but some countries have the same potential regional capabilities that are different from each other. For instance, Croatia conducts redeployment and integration training, military observer courses, and arms control courses. Macedonia has the capability to conduct regional training on public information, media, CIMIC, and medical. Bosnia and Herzegovina has the Peace Support Operation Training Center, which provides great programs for staff officers who will work in international staff and deployment. Each year, Albania provides education for senior officers and civilian equivalents in strategic studies on defense and security.

Regional Cooperation: A Comprehensive Approach for Mutual Response

Based on the findings on capability gaps and potential capabilities, the author suggest that ‘pulling and sharing’ is the smart way to build the operational approach to

³¹⁴ Balkan Medical Task Force, “Balkan Medical Task Force History.”

close the gap between the current condition and the desired and state.³¹⁵ A regional approach, focused on the six lines of effort will close the gap, ease completion of requirements for the integration process with NATO, and enhance security and stability. The transformation process and bridging the gap through regional cooperation will have significant implications in the A-5 countries. The implications are political, economic, social, and military.

Implications for the Armed Forces of A-5

At the strategical level, the regional cooperation is working very well, but when it came to the operational and tactical level, more action and implementation plans are needed. Applying the NATO smart defense in the A-5 is the best way to enhance capabilities at affordable costs. Each level of effort requires detailed analysis on current capabilities, and concepts of operations and requirements on each capability based on the NATO BI-SC Capability Codes and Capability Statements.

Second, each capability requires a legal basis and structure based on task list and DOTMLPF analysis. For instance, in the BMTF, the A-5 countries' gained experience that they can follow for other projects.

What is more important, each line of effort requires finding a lead nation, which can be one of countries with more capabilities that can provide assistance and expertise. Looking to the A-5 combined training teams in Afghanistan, Croatia is playing a lead nation role. As the lead nation, Croatia has really provided life support for all A-5

³¹⁵ Demi and Hudhra.

countries. In the findings, every country can offer specialized expertise and play a lead role in a different area of support.

In addition to the role of lead nation, the role of specialist nation, and knowing the challenges of the A-5 countries, developing these lines of effort requires support from NATO countries. The establishment of the BMTF was initiated by the United States, Norway, and countries from the region with Serbia in the lead nation role.³¹⁶

Finally, most importantly, cooperation among the A-5 will enhance collaboration and socialization of the armed forces in the region, and definitely bring more peace and stability throughout the Western Balkans.

Recommendations for Other Research

There are two important areas that mentioned and not researched, which play an important role in developing military capabilities, fulfilling the NATO obligations, and promoting stability in the region. For future research, it is important to address all the defense resources and military industry facilities that exist in the Western Balkans, which can be use in the future to sustain the armed forces of A-5 countries.

Second, Russia involvement in the Western Balkans has brought many security concerns with their use of the energy supply as an instrument to force their foreign policy in the Western Balkans. There should be a study of the impact of the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline on the dependence on Russia for energy by the Western Balkans. Trans-Adriatic Pipeline begins in Azerbaijan, will run through Georgia, Turkey, Greece, Albania, Italy, and the Adriatic countries in the Western Balkans.

³¹⁶ Balkan Medical Task Force, “Balkan Medical Task Force History.”

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